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CHAPTER 1
SMALL SCALE SERVICE RELATED PROJECT
Standard setting within the Lomond Healthcare NHS Trust 
Clinical Psychology Service.
Written for submission to Clinical Psychology Forum. 
Appendix 1:1 contains notes for contributors.
1
Abstract
This article reports the findings of an audit carried out by Lomond Healthcare NHS 
Trust Clinical Psychology department to determine whether local General 
Practitioners are satisfied with the service provided. This question is considered 
within the context of the audit cycle with a focus on the standard setting stage.
Keywords : audit cycle, Clinical Psychology, GP satisfaction
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INTRODUCTION
The Audit Cycle (Crombie et. al. 1993) defines a process of selecting a topic for 
audit, setting standards, measuring existing practice against these standards and 
changing the practice if the standards are not being met. In good audit this cycle is 
then repeated, to demonstrate that implemented changes actually do improve 
standards as expected. Clinical Psychology audit literature to date, shows little 
evidence of the key standard setting stage and few studies describe action being 
implemented arising from audit findings (Cape 1995).
This article reports the findings of an audit carried out by Lomond Healthcare 
Trust Clinical Psychology Department to determine whether local G.P.s are 
satisfied with the service provided. It considers this question in the context of the 
audit cycle, looking especially at the standard setting stage. One of the dictionary 
definitions of ‘standard’ is “...ordinary procedure..” ( The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 6th ed., 1977) and since ordinary procedure provided our only 
measurable criterion in the first instance we carried out a G.P. satisfaction survey 
to find out whether our ‘standards’ i.e. ordinary procedures , were satisfactory.
An initial G.P. satisfaction survey was carried out between November and 
December 1994 and on the basis of its’ findings certain changes to service 
provision were implemented in February 1995. 18 months later, between May and 
July 1996, local G.P.s were once again asked to complete the same satisfaction 
questionnaire.
The findings of both surveys were then compared to see whether or not these 
changes had been effective in improving the service.
It is the aim of this study to show that service has been improved over the last 18
3
months and to begin to set some standards against which future service provision 
can be audited. Stages in this process were:
1) To ascertain if local G.P.s, who refer over 80% of our department’s referrals, 
were satisfied with the service as provided, and if not, to find out what 
standards they expect - (1994 audit).
2) To implement changes to service provision as appropriate (based on stage 1).
3) To evaluate the effect of these changes on satisfaction with the service 18 
months later - (1996 audit).
4) To devise appropriate standards against which the service can be judged in the 
future.
METHOD
An initial audit was carried out between November and December 1994 and 
subsequent changes to service provision were implemented in February 
1995. Between May and July 1996 this audit was repeated .
INITIAL A UDIT( 1994)
Method
At the end of 1994 13/15 G.P. practices in the Lomond Trust Area were visited by 
Clinical Psychologists and every G.P. in the district was asked to complete a 
satisfaction questionnaire designed by the Clinical Psychology department. 
Response rate was 78% (51/65) which was very good (Stallard and Chadwick 
1991, Blakey 1996) possibly due to the salience of the task in the light of a 
personal visit.
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Results
The main problems identified were:-
1) Long waiting list
2) No system for urgent referrals
3) Lack of confidence about appropriateness of referral.
4) Lack of choice of psychologist.
92% (43/47) of G.P.s indicated that they would like to refer more patients to the 
Clinical Psychology service but did not because of the above reasons. G.P.s were 
generally satisfied with communication with the department with over 80% 
indicating that they prefer brief reports to long, detailed ones.
At the end of 1994 only 44% (21/48) of G.P.s who answered the question, regarded 
the service positively, 8% (4/48) regarded it negatively and 48% (23/48) reported 
mixed feelings. This indicated that there was room for improvement before 
standards were set.
Action
Subsequent to these findings the following changes were implemented :-
1) Waiting list eradicated. Aim to see most non-urgent referrals within 4-6 weeks.
2) Introduction of an urgent referrals system. Aim to see most urgent referrals 
within 1-2 weeks.
3) An information leaflet on making appropriate referrals given to every G.P.
4) Increasingly brief letters and reports sent, except when a detailed one is 
relevant.
5) G.P.s encouraged to telephone psychologists directly if they have any concerns 
about making referrals.
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REPEA T A EDIT (1996)
Method
Between March- July 1996 Clinical Psychologists revisited 11/15 G.P. practices to 
further discuss service provision. It was not possible to arrange meetings with the 
four remaining practices but they were invited to respond to the Satisfaction 
Survey. All G.P.s in the area (n = 63) were asked to complete a questionnaire, the 
same questionnaire that they were asked to complete in 1994, but with one 
additional question about locality of service (see appendix 1:2). Response rate was 
81% (51/63) which is consistent with the response rate for the initial audit and 
therefore allows a valid comparison of results. This is a high response rate towards 
which the following factors may have contributed :- 
~ Short, clear questionnaire on 1 piece of A4 paper.
~ Self addressed envelope provided for return via internal mail.
~ Questionnaires distributed by Clinical Psychologists at time of meeting with 
each practice to discuss service provision.
~ Duplicate questionnaire sent to non-responders via practice manager with a 
request to return within 2 weeks, this was an important stage since 43% of all the 
returns were received after the reminder.
Aims
The specific aims of the 1996 audit were:-
1) To evaluate the effect of service changes introduced in February 1995.
2) To examine current G.P. referral patterns and satisfaction with the Clinical 
Psychology service with a view to further service development.
3) To set standards to serve as the basis for future audit.
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Results
60% (30/50) of G.P.s indicated that they would still like to refer more people to the 
Clinical Psychology service (compared with 92% (43/47) in the 1994 audit). Main 
reasons for this are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 Factors preventing referral
PERCEIVED PROBLEM G.P.RESPONSE (%) 
1996
G.P.RESPONSE(%)
1994
Waiting time too long 45 92
Lack of capacity for urgent referrals 27 47
Unsure if referral is appropriate 25 35
Patient unwilling to attend 22 12
Not enough psychology sessions 16 0
No choice of psychologist 0 27
Waiting Times
In 1994 over 90% of G.P.s perceived waiting time as a major problem with the 
service, this was halved in 1996 after a system was introduced enabling most non 
urgent referrals to be seen within 4-6 weeks. In both audits more than 80% of G.P.s 
indicated satisfaction with waiting times of less than 6 weeks for non urgent 
patients. In the period March 94 - March 95 the average waiting time for non­
urgent referrals was 8.3 weeks (range 1-36 weeks). In the period March 95 - 
March 96 it was 5.66 weeks (range 1-14 weeks).
In 1994 47% of G.P.s perceived the lack of capacity for urgent referrals as a major 
problem.This was also almost halved in 1996, to 27% (14/51), after a system to 
accommodate urgent referrals was introduced.
In both the 1994 and 1996 audits more than 50% of G.P.s indicated that they 
expect urgent referrals to be seen within 1 week (i.e 7days) and more than 90% 
expect them to be seen within 2 weeks. In the period March 95 - March 96 only 18
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people were referred to the service urgently and of these 28% (5/18) were seen 
within 1 week and 56% (10/18) were seen within 2 weeks. The longest waiting 
time was 5 weeks.
Appropriateness of Referral
In 1994 35% of respondents reported a lack of confidence about making 
appropriate referrals. In 1996 25% are still not confident despite having been 
issued with an information leaflet about referring and having been encouraged to 
telephone the department directly if they are unsure.
Written Communication
In both audits G..P.S are generally satisfied with the information they receive and 
therefore with the pre-existing standard of written communication (see Table 2 ) 
There was a resounding preference for brief reports ( >90%) rather than long, 
detailed ones.
Table 2 Satisfaction with written communication
SUBJECT OF COMMUNICATION Satisfaction (%) 
1996
Satisfaction(%)
1994
Waiting Time 75 67
Initial assessment, formulation & treatment plan 96 90
Progress of treatment 79 79
Termination & Discharge 92 98
None attendance by patients 98 94
General Perception of Clinical Psychology Service 
The changes to the service implemented in 1995 appear to have been 
effective. This is evident in the swing towards a more positive regard for the 
service ( see Table 3 ) and an increase in the number of referrals from 244 (Mar 94 
-Mar 95) to 408 (Mar 95-Mar 96) aided by the appointment of an extra Clinical
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Psychologist (1.0 w.t.e.)
Table 3 Perception of Clinical Psychology service
REGARD FOR SERVICE G.P.Response (%) 
1996
G.P.Response (%) 
1994
Positive 76 44
Negative 2 8
Mixed Feelings 22 48
Content analysis of comments made also shows a shift. In 1994 62 % (13/21) of 
all comments involved concern about long waiting times and the inaccessibility of 
the service. In 1996 only 13% (3/23) of all comments pertained to waiting times or 
inaccessibility, however 43% (10/23) raised the issue of the lack of Child and 
Adolescent services in this area. A new grade B post has been created , but the 
vacancy has not yet been filled.
In the light of comments received in the 1994 audit regarding the inaccessibility of 
the service an additional question was added to the 1996 audit, which asked 
whether service provision was sufficiently local. 92% (45/49) of G.P.s were 
satisfied that it was. This was achieved by doubling clinical sessions from 6 to 
12, for Adult Direct Access patients, and basing them in three different localities, 
Helensburgh, Alexandria, and Dumbarton.
Summary of Main Findings of 1996 Audit
1) 45% of G.P.s still perceive waiting times as too long and an impediment to 
making referrals, even though waiting times have actually reduced from a mean 
waiting time of 8.03 weeks to 5.66 weeks.
2) 27% of G.P.s still perceive a lack of capacity for urgent referrals even though a 
system has been in place for over a year.
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3) 25% of G.P.s are still unsure about the appropriateness of their referrals.
4) 90% of G.P.s are happy with the standards of written communication.
5) 76% of G.P.s regard the service positively, 2% regard it negatively and 22% 
report mixed feelings about it.
DISCUSSION
Comparison of the results from the ‘94 and ‘96 audits shows that implemented 
changes to service provision have been effective in shifting G.P s satisfaction with 
the Clinical Psychology service in a positive direction and has allowed us to begin 
to set some standards.This is reflected in the increase in the number of referrals 
which has tripled in the last three years (see Table 4).
Table 4 Number of referrals to Clinical Psychology
YEAR NO. OF REFERRALS
Apr 93 -94 122
Apr 94 -95 244
Apr 95 -96 408
It is interesting to note, however, that even though waiting times have reduced 
markedly, almost half of G.P.s still perceive waiting times as being too long and 
over a quarter still think there is no capacity for urgent referrals.This demonstrates 
that even when a standard is set and maintained, its’ positive effect can be 
outweighed by negative attitudes based on historical experience and inaccurate 
information regarding the current state of play. To try and redress this imbalance it 
might be beneficial for the department to further encourage open communication 
by publishing annual statistics for each practice, for example, then accurate
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information can be shared and improvements planned, based on facts rather than 
fallacies. Hopefully, this will reinforce positive changes and highlight negative 
changes, as areas for further investigation.
It is encouraging that the number of G.P.s viewing the service positively has 
almost doubled over the last 18 months and that the number expressing mixed 
feelings has halved. However, 24% still express reservations concerning their 
Clinical Psychology service. We would prefer this not to be the case and through 
the continued use of a dynamic audit cycle of change and evaluation and continued 
consultation with our service users, we aim to develop the service to its’ full 
potential.
CONCLUSIONS
1) Changes made to service provision in February 1995 have been effective in 
improving the service.
2) The audit cycle cannot be completed without standards being set. As 
demonstrated in this study, the process of standard setting is dynamic with 
standards continually evolving through the audit process.
3) On the basis of the findings from this study the following standards can be set
• Waiting time for non-urgent referrals will ideally be less than 6 weeks.
• Waiting times for urgent referrals will ideally be less than 2 weeks.
• Written communication will be in the form of brief letters where possible with
information given about assessment, progress, discharge and non-attendance as 
appropriate.
• Services will be provided locally where possible.
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In this study G.P.s are the major referrers to the Lomond Healthcare Trust Clinical 
Psychology services and therefore were the first group consulted in the standard 
setting process. However, the needs of the other referrers, patients, government 
and clinical psychologists themselves must also contribute to the evolution of these 
standards. An interesting consideration is whether or not, within the context of the 
audit cycle, one has different ‘sets’ of standards depending on which aspect of the 
service is being audited, or one set of hybrid, flexible standards against which any 
aspect of the service can be evaluated e.g ‘acceptable’ time between referral and 
1st appointment might vary between 1 week and 9 weeks, depending on which 
viewpoint is taken, so where does one set the standard ?
On the basis of this study it is suggested that the following changes to service 
provision be implemented
• Each G.P. practice to be issued with annual statistics of referral rates and 
waiting times for both urgent and non-urgent referrals.
• As soon as the vacant Child Psychologist post is filled the local service 
will be developed.
• Further liaison with G.P.s to increase confidence in appropriate referral. 
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CHAPTER 2
MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECT 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Re - experiencing Phenomena in PTSD
Written for submission to Behaviour Research and Therapy 
Appendix 2: 1 contains notes for contributors.
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ABSTRACT
Re- experiencing aspects of a trauma via recurrent and distressing imagery is a 
fundamental criterion of PTSD. Such imagery is also frequently utilised in PTSD 
treatment protocols based on exposure paradigms. Despite this, however, the 
phenomenology of re-experiencing symptoms, is not well understood. There is a 
paucity of descriptive literature and definitions of different types of intrusive imagery 
are unclear.
This paper will review the literature with a view to clarifying current understanding of 
re-experiencing phenomenology The role of re-experiencing symptoms in cognitive 
processing models of PTSD will also be reviewed.
Keywords :- Post traumatic stress disorder, imagery, flashback.
is
INTRODUCTION
Post traumatic stress disorder ( PTSD) is a reaction of normal individuals to extreme 
trauma ( Horowitz 1986, Lifton 1988 ). Re- experiencing the trauma via intrusive 
imagery is a core, yet poorly understood, feature of PTSD.
Prevalence rates for PTSD vary enormously. Community based studies suggest a 
lifetime prevalence ranging from 1% -14% with variability related to differences in 
diagnostic methods, resulting from poorly defined criteria thus allowing for variable 
interpretation, and different populations sampled. Studies of'at risk' individuals have 
yielded hugely varying prevalence rates, ranging from 3% - 58% (DSMIV, APA 
1994). Because prevalence rates for PTSD itself are so variable, it is difficult to assess 
the prevalence of different types of re-experiencing symptomatology within PTSD. 
Hodgkinson and Stewart (1989), however, have attempted to review the frequency of 
re-experiencing phenomena for a variety of groups of survivors. They found that 
'intrusive imagery' occurred with a frequency of between 46% - 88%, and 'nightmares' 
occurred with a frequency of between 34% - 69% . 'As if ’ reliving experiences were 
not described in all groups. They were reportedly absent in survivors of terrorism with 
PTSD, but occurred with a frequency of 57% in " general traumatic stress patients ". 
The meaning of such inconsistencies is difficult to establish since the methodology 
differs between studies. Data concerning re-experiencing phenomena, where it does 
exist, is predominantly secondary to other aspects of PTSD research, thus the 
reliability of such data may also be doubtful.
Ullman (1995) assessed the relationship between the type of traumatic event reported 
and symptom reports. Re-experiencing was found to be most common in victims of
1fS
combat and victims of physical or sexual assault, whereas victims of natural disasters 
and accidents reported less re-experiencing symptomatology. This might suggest that 
repeated traumatic experiences are associated more closely with re-experiencing 
phenomena than unitary traumatic experiences. However, since most of the PTSD 
literature is based on work done with combat veteran populations, it would seem 
premature to accept this assumption before more data is available from studies of 
PTSD in other populations.
HISTORY OF CRITERION DEVELOPMENT FOR PTSD
Although severe reactions to trauma have been described in the psychological 
literature for over 100 years, it was not until the publication of DSM in ( APA 1980) 
that PTSD was first established as a specific diagnostic category. The original 
diagnostic criteria were updated in the revised version of DSM III (DSM-III-R, APA 
1987 ) and again with the publication of DSM IV ( APA 1994 ). It is perhaps not 
surprising then, that there is still much work to be done with respect to studying, 
describing, and clarifying definitions of PTSD symptomatology, including re- 
experiencing.
The core symptoms of PTSD include autonomic hyperarousal, avoidance of stimuli 
associated with the trauma and re-experiencing of the traumatic event via intrusive 
imagery. The symptom of ‘ physiological reactivity in response to reminders of the 
trauma’, appeared in the hyperarousal section in earlier versions of DSM. It appears in 
the re-experiencing section for the first time in DSM IV. The reason for this change 
however, is unclear.
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Although re-experiencing phenomena are central to a diagnosis of PTSD relatively 
little work has been published clarifying phenomenology ( Brett and OstrofF, 1985, 
Reynolds and Tarrier, 1996 ).
DEFINITIONS OF RE-EXPERIENCING
DSM IV criteria, even though they are agreed upon by a clinical committee, rather 
than based upon empirical evidence, probably provide the best starting point for 
discussion of the definition of re-experiencing phenomena, especially since they 
provide the diagnostic basis for many modem research projects.
DSM IV (criterion B)
Re-experiencing phenomena occupy a broad spectrum. DSM IV defines re- 
experiencing of a traumatic event in section 309.81, criterion B. This criterion is met 
if a person re-experiences the traumatic event in at least one of the following ways :-
1) Recurrent intrusive recollections of the event, including images , thoughts or 
perceptions.
2) Recurrent, distressing dreams of the traumatic event.
3) Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring ( includes a sense of 
reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback 
episodes including those that occur on awakening or whilst intoxicated).
4) Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that 
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
5) Physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or 
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event ( DSM IV, APA 1994 ).
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There is a potential for under or over diagnosing of PTSD, based upon the decision of 
whether a particular symptom is present to a sufficient degree or not. Explicit 
guidelines for when to count a symptom, which is a normal response to trauma, as 
present to a pathological degree, are not provided in DSM IV. There is a need for the 
distinguishing features between ‘reliving’ and ‘remembering’ experiences to be 
clearly identified. The boundaries between them are confused under the umberella of 
re-experiencing phenomena.
It is also unclear why DSM IV finds it necessary to describe five categories of re- 
experiencing, when only one is required, in addition to aetiology, avoidance and hyper 
arousal criteria, for diagnosis. Consider the following example from the clinical 
literature ( Chamey et al., 1993, p.294 ) :-
".. there was a bolt of cracking thunder, I awoke instantly, frozen in fear. I am right 
back in Vietnam, in the middle of the monsoon season at my guard post. I am sure I 
will get hit in the next volley and convinced I will die. My hands are freezing, yet 
sweat pours from my entire body. I feel each hair on the back of my neck standing on 
end. I can't catch my breath and my heart is pounding. I smell a damp sulfur smell. 
Suddenly I see what's left of my buddy,., his head on a bamboo platter, sent back to our 
camp by the Viet Cong. Propaganda messages are stuffed between his clenched teeth. 
The next bolt of lightening and clap of thunder makes me jump so much that I fall to 
the floor..."
The external trigger for this intrusive imagery is the noise of the thunder bolt. This 
results in physiological ( eg sweat, hair standing on end, pounding heart), and 
psychological ( eg. fear, believes self to be in Vietnam, convinced he is about to d ie )
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responses, thus meeting criteria B4 and B5. Any one of these symptoms themselves 
could also be interpreted as a cue ‘symbolising or resembling an aspect of the trauma’. 
However, these symptoms occur within the context of ‘reliving’, ‘I am right back in
Vietnam I smell a damp sulfur smell, I see w hat‘s left of my buddy’ thus also
meeting criteria B3. To complicate matters further this imagery occurs upon waking 
from sleep. It is not clear whether the narrator is fully conscious when this experience 
occurs, or is in fact dreaming. ‘I awoke instantly’ would suggest the former, but this is 
clarified by ‘....frozen in fear’, which could have been perceived in either the waking 
or dream state. It is unclear then, whether criterion B2 is met or not. This example 
highlights the complexity of ‘re-experiencing’ and shows how criteria B3, B4, B5 and 
possibly B2, can be met simultaneously, thus suggesting the criteria are not mutually 
exclusive and are therefore of limited usefulness.
Reliving experiences and ’Flashbacks*
The definition of'flashback', which is used both commonly and clinically to describe 
reliving type experiences, is particularly confusing. In their 1985 review Mellman and 
Davis concluded that it was not entirely clear what constituted a 'flashback'. Over a 
decade later this is still the case, even though in general PTSD research has flourished. 
DSM IV defines a 'flashback' as ".. a recurrence of a memory, feeling or perceptual 
experience from the past." ( Glossary p.766, DSM IV, APA 1994). This definition 
suggests that a 'flashback' is a remembering rather than a reliving experience.
However, in criterion B, the term 'flashback' is used only in the description of criterion 
B3, ie acting or feeling as if the event were recurring, in the context of'dissociative
? . n
flashback'.
This suggests that a dissociative flashback is a reliving experience. This issue is 
confused further by descriptions o f ‘reliving’ experiences, termed 'flashbacks', which 
are reported in the clinical literature. A fundamental aspect to these descriptions is a 
sensation as if elements of the trauma were actually happening ie being perceptually 
and emotionally re-experienced in present time.
Flashbacks in the literature are defined variously as :-
".. revisualisations of a traumatic scene that occurs with realistic intensity in the 
presence of a clear sensorium..'' ( p.374, Burstein 1985 )
"..the victim feels as if he or she is reliving the traumatic experience.." ( p.644, Turner 
1991)
"..a sudden re-experiencing of a stressful situation..” ( p.381, Mellman and Davis, 
1985)
".. memories so vivid that they are perceived as a reliving of the past in the present.." 
(p.383, Kline and Rausch, 1985 )
"..a posttraumatic flashback is a perceptual re-experience of a specific traumatic
event flashbacks are characterised by extreme emotional and physiological arousal
during which the person may feel immobilised and unaware of immediate 
surroundings..almost any stimulus associated with the trauma can trigger flashbacks, 
even when its' connection to the trauma goes unrecognised.." ( p.49, Calhoun and 
Resick, 1993 ).
This last definition in particular, highlights the potential for confusion between DSM 
IV criteria B3, B4 and B5.
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To add to the confusion, reports o f ’pseudoflashbacks' and 'pseudomemories' also 
appear in the literature.These are trauma related, intrusive, recurrent, vivid images in 
which the actual content of the image has not been previously experienced ie it is not 
a memory of a physically perceived traumatic event, but of an imagined traumatic 
event.
Burstein (1985 ) describes the case of a woman who experienced distressing 
visualisations of an accident that her husband had experienced, but which she did not 
herself witness. Bryant ( 1996 ) describes intrusive imagery in people who have 
sustained a head injury as the result of a road accident yet who remain amnesic for 
the actual traumatic event. Intrusions are of images of the accident based not on their 
own memory of it but on information learned since the trauma. Such imagery is 
termed 'pseudomemory' and is phenomenologically similiar to 'flashbacks' in PTSD. 
Bryant identifies the need to distinguish between involuntary recollections of a 
recalled event, pseudomemories of events which are not recalled, and imagery which 
involves a sense of re-experiencing a previous traumatic event. Briggs (1993) 
describes a fascinating case of delayed onset PTSD following a road 
accident in which 'organic memories' of the original accident, in the form of a 
previously healed, bleeding scar, appear to have been relived.
Appropriate definition of the different types of imagery experienced is important for 
both consistent clinical diagnosis of PTSD and theoretical understanding of the 
complexity of cognitive responses to trauma.
THE ROLE OF RE-EXPERIENCING IN PTSD
The role of re-experiencing in the development and maintenance of PTSD is not fully
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understood. Re-experiencing phenomena support the suggestion that cognitive 
representations of traumatic experiences reside in a primed or partially activated state 
in memory ( McNally et al, 1987) resulting in recurrent, involuntary retrieval of 
disturbing, trauma linked memories, until they can be fully integrated. These 
intrusions have been identified as a link between the original traumatic experience and 
the development of PTSD.
Various theories suggest that exposure to a traumatic event results in traumatic 
conditioning ( Brown and Kulik, 1977), leading to the acquisition of conditioned 
autonomic and emotional responses ( Kolb and Mutalipassi, 1982 ). Through stimulus 
generalisation other stimuli, and the memories themselves, become associated and 
form the basis of intrusions and flashbacks ( Kilpatrick et al, 1985 ), which are then 
avoided. Oscillating states of re-experiencing and avoidance, together with 
hyperarousal thus form the basis of PTSD ( Horowitz, 1976, 1986 ). However, people 
can often experience intense and distressing intrusions as an immediate response to a 
trauma, without developing PTSD ( McFarlane,1992, Shalev, 1992 ) suggesting a 
more complex aetiological and maintaining system.
The Developing Role of Re-experiencing in Theoretical Models Of PTSD
Over 100 years ago Pierre Janet (1889) taught that overwhelming experiences are 
accompanied by 'vehement emotions', which interfere with information processing and 
consequent appropriate action. He thought that this hyperarousal caused the memory 
disturbances which he observed to accompany traumatisation, by interfering with 
information processing. He postulated that hyperarousal caused memories to split off
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from consciousness and to be stored as Visceral memories' ie visual images or bodily 
sensations. Fragments of these memories returned later as physiological reactions, 
emotional states, nightmares and behavioural enactments ( Van der Kolk et al. 1989 ) 
Since Janet a variety of theoretical models have been proposed in attempts to organise 
observed patterns of reaction in PTSD, all stressing various aspects of the traumatic 
experience as core. Brett and Ostroff (1985) in a comprehensive review of theories of 
PTSD, contend that there has been a general failure to appreciate the central role of 
re-experiencing via imagery in clinical theories and empirical investigation of PTSD. 
Models of PTSD are generally criticised for their failure to provide explicit 
descriptions of the many ways in which imagery can develop, being limited 
predominantly to the narrow band of traumatic imagery occurring primarily in 
nightmares. The work of Horowitz ( 1970,1976,1979) is identified as an exception. 
This work has focused most clearly and thoroughly on the role of imagery in stress 
disorders. This work has recently been reconceptualised by Creamer et al (1992, 1993) 
and is complimented by Van der Kolk and Fisler (1995) who conceptaulise traumatic 
memories in terms of fragmentation and narrative development. These theories will be 
considered below.
Horowitz
Horowitz ( 1976,1980,1986 ) proposed a highly influential information processing 
model of PTSD. Intrusions are viewed as predictable, initial responses to a traumatic 
event, which, because of their painful nature, are avoided. PTSD develops as a 
consequence of the need for an individual to either integrate the traumatic memories 
within pre-existing schemata, or to develop new schemata to accommodate them. The
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precipitating traumatic event is usually sudden, intense, unanticipated and important. 
The process of integration and revision of the memory of it, however, is slow 
( Horowitz 1980 ). Perceptions of the event and representations of any immediate 
associations to it are recorded in active memory which Horowitz hypothesises has the 
intrinsic property of repeated representation. This results in intrusive thoughts and 
images about the trauma which are accompanied by intense emotion. Traumatic 
memories are held in active memory, out of conscious awareness, and the mechanisms 
of avoidance and emotional numbing are employed to keep the individual from being 
overwhelmed.
The process of integration is set in motion by each representation, with completion 
being reached when traumatic memories can be interpreted to fit inner schema 
models. The traumatic event then becomes part of long term memory processes and 
new expectancy schemata and intrusive repetition is no longer necessary. Until such 
completion occurs however, episodic representation occurs during both sleep and 
waking states. Horowitz postulates an oscillating process between re-experience and 
avoidance until such completion is reached. Anxiety is dissipated as the individuals 
cognitive system becomes integrated and viable as a means for understanding and 
responding to their perceptions of the world.
Although Horowitz presents a comprehensive theory, it is limited in its' ability to 
address the critical issue of why some individuals develop PTSD when others who 
have been exposed to the same trauma do not, and to account for delayed onset PTSD. 
It is also challenged by the observation that the frequency and intensity of re- 
experiencing phenomena immediately following a traumatic event are not predictive
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of PTSD development ( McFarlane 1992 ).
Creamer
Following from Horowitz's seminal work, cognitive processing models propose that 
people enter situations with pre-existing schemata containing information about their 
past experiences, beliefs, assumptions and expectations ( Hollon and Kriss 1984 ). 
Following trauma, people are confronted with information which is inconsistent with 
that contained in existing safety and invulnerability schemata in particular. Creamer et 
al (1992) propose a five stage model of response to traumatic stress based upon a 
feedback loop between intrusion, avoidance, and other symptom levels. The 
successful processing and integration of the total trauma experience is central to 
recovery.
Stage 1 - Objective Exposure
The individual is faced with a traumatic experience, the initial response to which will 
be influenced by their subjective perceptions of the event as well as the severity of the 
traumatic stressor ( Horowitz 1986, Foa et al 1989 ).
Stage 2 - Network Formation
Building on the work of Lang (1977) and Foa et al (1989) a network formation stage is 
formulated. If an incident is not perceived as frightening or threatening then the 
trauma related memories will not be perceived as threatening either, eg rape victims 
who perceived their assault to be life threatening were more likely to develop PTSD 
than those who did not ( Kilpatrick et al 1989 ).The case is described of a rape victim 
who did not develop symptoms of PTSD until some months after the rape when she
learned that her attacker had actually killed his next rape victim ( Kilpatrick 1986 ). 
Only with this new information did she re-interpret the rape situation as life 
threatening and only then did it become cognitively represented in memory as a fear 
structure ( Lang 1977). Formation of the traumatic memory network then, is 
determined primarily by characteristics of the traumatic experience itself, including 
stimulus, response and meaning propositions. Other factors such as pre-trauma 
personality, prior experience and culture will also contribute.
Stage 3 - Intrusion / Network Resolution
Before recovery can occur the traumatic memory networks must be accessed and 
modified ie the network resolution process. Activation occurs when information is 
presented which matches stimulus, response or meaning information in the memory 
network ( Lang 1977). Since both stimulus and response information is contained 
within the same network, activation results not only in intrusive recollections of the 
trauma but also in the accompanying aversive response elements. This exposure to 
traumatic information held within the fear structure, outwith the context of the 
traumatic experience, allows stimulus-response connections to be weakened and 
prompts modification of the meaning associated with the traumatic stimulus. Intrusive 
experiences may be functional and associated with symptom reduction over time as 
the fear network is gradually modified, as the models of Horowitz, Foa et al, and 
Creamer suggest. However, they may also be dysfunctional, resulting in very high 
arousal and prompting effective avoidance strategies. Hunt (1997) has observed that 
many World War two veterans have used avoidance strategies so efficiently, that only 
upon commencing retirement, do re-experiencing phenomena emerge. This suggests
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that perceptions of trauma can remain unchanged and unaccessed in a memory system 
for over 50 years, unaffected by normal processes of forgetting.
Stage 4 - Avoidance
Creamer et al (1992) argue that intrusion precedes avoidance with the latter 
conceptualised as a coping strategy in response to the discomfort caused by intrusive 
thoughts. Although avoidance strategies , such as blocking out traumatic memories 
and avoiding reminders of the trauma, may reduce immediate distress, they also 
reduce the chances of activating the fear network. For recovery to occur the network 
must be activated for periods of time which are long enough to allow for effective 
processing there is however, no optimal time specified within the theory.
Stage 5 - Outcome
Recovery is achieved through the network resolution process. Activation and 
modification of the memory network, as evidenced by re-experiencing phenomena, 
results in symptom levels which are initially high but which reduce over time.
This model is limited in that it cannot account for the clinical observation that many 
PTSD sufferers, eg war veterans, have experienced intrusive symptoms for decades 
without change occurring. ( Crocq et al 1993, Hunt 1997). Neither does it account for 
those WW2 veterans who have successfuly avoided re-experiencing phenomena for 
decades until retirement. Creamer’s theory would suggest that they have nevertheless 
carried latent unprocessed experiences. Within the theory, the re-emergence of 
intrusive imagery would be seen as a positive step in the trauma resolution process. 
The veterans, however, may disagree.
TRAUMATIC MEMORIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NARRATIVE
Van der Kolk and Fisler (1995) have postulated a theory of how traumatic memories 
might be processed and modified, using a model of implicit and explicit memory 
( Squire 1994 ). They suggest that the original traumatic experience is input into 
implicit memory via rapid classical conditioning. This is not under conscious control 
but is rapidly accessible via stimulus cues. They suggest that traumatic memories are 
first retrieved in the form of dissociated mental imprints of sensory and affective 
elements of the traumatic experience ie 'intrusions' from implicit memory. Over time 
these intrusive memories are processed into a 'story'. A personal narrative of the 
trauma gradually emerges ie from explicit memory. At first traumatic memories are 
experienced as actual reliving events, but eventually, through continued modification, 
these memories are translated into a story which develops over time with new 
elements of the traumatic experience being involuntarily re-experienced, voluntarily 
recalled, and incorporated into the story at different times. Within this model an 
individual copes with intrusive memories by avoidance, in which case the information 
remains in implicit memory and continues to be intrusive; or by processing the 
memories into a story. This story is then stored in explicit memory which is under 
conscious control.
Support is provided for this model by Pennebaker (1993). He has observed that when 
individuals are asked to write about personally upsetting experiences, significant 
improvements in physical health occur. It seems that the construction of a coherent 
story, together with the expression of negative emotion, work together in therapeutic 
narrative. He suggests that the movement towards the development of a narrative is
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more predictive of health than having a coherent story per se. Consistent with this, a 
recent pilot study investigating the effect of self monitoring, using written diaries, of 
the frequency and duration of intrusions over a two month period, associated self 
monitoring with a reduction in overall PTSD symptomatology ( Reynolds and Tarrier 
1996). The therapeutic implications of encouraging story construction in the treatment 
of PTSD needs to be investigated empirically.
THE USE OF IMAGERY IN THE TREATMENT OF PTSD
The use of symptoms of re-experiencing, eg intrusive imagery, albeit poorly 
defined and understood, is common in the treatment of PTSD.
Direct therapeutic exposure to memories of trauma is a treatment technique 
commonly used across different models of PTSD, although the precise elements of 
imagery used may differ ( Fairbank and Nicholson, 1987, Grigsby, 1987,Shapiro,
1989, Richards and Rose, 1991,Vaughan and Tarrier, 1992, and Thompson, 1995 ). 
Recent innovations in PTSD treatment ( reviewed by Walsh 1997) include Thought 
Field Therapy, Visual Kinesthetic Dissociation, Eye Movement Desensitisation and 
Reprocessing and Traumatic Incident Reduction techniques. All of these involve 
working with an individuals traumatic imagery in various ways. They claim to be fast 
and efficient but remain to be evaluated.
CONCLUSION
There is a need for a deeper understanding of the whole spectrum of re-experiencing 
symptoms in order :-
1) to inform psychological theory about the development, maintenance and treatment 
ofPTSD
2) to inform clinical decisions about whether or not imagery should be a focus for 
treatment
3) to inform decisions regarding which types of image, which specific images and 
which particular aspects of these images will be most amenable to change.
There is also a need for an understanding of how re-experiencing phenomena change 
over time and how this relates, if at all, to the recovery process. The challenge to 
clinicians is to be able to help an individual to use their own distressing imagery as a 
therapeutic tool as gently as possible, without re-traumatising them during treatment. 
( Horowitz, 1986, Solomon, 1992 ).
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CHAPTER 3
MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECT PROPOSAL
Re- experiencing Phenomena in PTSD - A Descriptive 
Analysis
Submitted to and approved by Greater Glasgow Community and Mental Health 
Services NHS Trust Ethics Committee.
SUMMARY
Post traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) is characterised by distressing re-experiencing 
phenomena such as recurrent intrusive thoughts and images, dreams and flashbacks 
relating to a traumatic experience. (DSMIV, APA 1994). There is very little research 
literature, however, on how these phenomena relate to each other.
A pilot study is proposed which aims to interview 8 -1 0  people currently receiving 
outpatient treatment for PTSD using the current and lifetime diagnostic version of the 
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for DSM IV (CAPS-DX, Blake et al 1990, 1996). 
Qualitative methods will be used to explore and describe subjective accounts of re- 
experiencing phenomena. This study aims to focus on the types of re-experience 
reported and the relationship between trauma content and re-experience content.
RE-EXPERIENCING PHENOMENA IN PTSD - A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
AIM
To explore and describe subjective accounts of different types of re-experiencing 
phenomena in post traumatic stress syndrome. The phenomenology of 'flashbacks' is 
of particular interest ie sense of re-experience of traumatic stimuli as distinct from 
recall of traumatic memories.
INTRODUCTION
Although intrusive imagery, phenomena such as trauma related dreams, flashbacks, 
and recurrent daytime recollections associated with an experienced trauma are 
diagnostic for PTSD (DSM IV, APA 1994) there is relatively little research literature 
directly examining the role of such imagery in the development, maintenance or 
treatment of this disorder.
Based on observations of World War 1 veterans, Freud was first to describe trauma 
reactions as having two main characteristics, re-experiencing through intrusive 
imagery and avoidance of any stimuli associated with the trauma. Since then, the work 
of Horowitz (1976,1986) has focused most clearly on the role of imagery in PTSD. 
Horowitz conceptualises trauma as a stress on an individual's information processing 
system. Intrusions are viewed as predictable, initial responses to any traumatic event, 
which, because of the emotional pain attached to them, are actively avoided.This 
model suggests that PTSD develops as a consequence of the inability of an individual 
to either integrate the traumatic experience within his pre-existing schemata, or to 
develop new schemata to accommodate it. It is hypothesised that until this process is
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complete, perceptions of the trauma remain in active memory, resulting in intrusive 
thoughts and images about the trauma, which are accompanied by intense emotion. 
Two oscillating processes are postulated as being necessary for trauma resolution, an 
intrusion phase during which repetition of traumatic imagery and affect occur (i.e re- 
experiencing), and a denial phase, during which a variety of mechanisms are 
employed to prevent or avoid these repetitions. As these states alternate, symptoms 
decrease as the representation of the trauma is gradually incorporated into the totality 
of a person's experience at a schema level, and equilibrium is re-established.
Although Horowitz's work has been the basis of the development of many treatment 
approaches (based on exposure and de-sensitisation), comparatively little work has 
been documented looking at the actual process of re-experiencing. A notable 
exception to this is work by Creamer and colleagues ( 1992,1995 ).
There is little work on the definition , classification and relationships between 
different re-experiencing phenomena such as dreams, flashbacks, and intrusive 
memories. Literature often refers to 'intrusions' o r ' re-experiencing' without being 
more definitive. DSM IV criteria for PTSD are similarly broad based when 
describing symptoms of re-experiencing.
The current study aims to look more closely at the relationship between the actual 
traumatic incident and the resulting re-experiencing phenomena, by asking people to 
describe their own experiences and reactions since their trauma. 5 categories of re- 
experiencing will be investigated, corresponding to the 5 DSM IV criteria, using semi­
structured interview (CAPS) i.e
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1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the traumatic event, including 
images, thoughts and perceptions (Criterion Bl).
2) recurrent distressing dreams of the traumatic event (Criterion B2 ).
3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of 
reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations and dissociative flashback 
episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated)
( Criterion B 3 ).
4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that 
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event ( Criterion B4 ).
5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or 
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event ( Criterion B5 ).
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
This proposed pilot study aims to explore the following questions : - 
How frequently are criteria Bl -B5 met ?
What are the characteristics of a ‘reliving’ experience ?
How do the re-experiencing categories relate to each other ?
How closely does the content of the re-experience relate to the content of the original 
trauma ?
Is intrusion type consistent within individuals, during the course of their PTSD ?
PLAN OF INVESTIGATION 
Participants
N = 8 - 10
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Participants will be recruited from Clinical Psychology departments within Greater 
Glasgow Health Board area. They will currently be receiving outpatient treatment for 
symptoms of PTSD. They will be identified by primary care, Clinical Psychology 
outpatient clinics and invited to participate in the study. If they wish to participate 
they will be given written information and asked to provide written consent ( see 
Appendix 3:1)
Measures
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for DSM IV ( CAPS - D X ) ( Blake et al 1996 ) 
Impact of Events Scale ( IES ) ( Horowitz et al 1979 )
Beck Depression Inventory ( BD I) ( Beck et al 1961)
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory ( STAI) ( Spielberger et al 1983 )
Design and Procedure
Participants consenting to take part in this study will be given an information sheet 
and invited to attend for 1 session only. They will be asked to complete all of the 
above measures. Interviews will be audiotaped to allow for qualitative analysis of 
verbatim responses to the CAPS. Participants will be encouraged to use free narrative 
to describe their experiences in as much detail as possible.
Settings and Equipment
It is anticipated that participants will be seen on the same premises as they would 
normally attend for their out-patient appointments.
Other than copies of the above measures and audiotaping equipment which the 
researcher will provide, no specialist equipment is required.
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Data Analysis
Data will be analysed using qualitative methodology.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
- Description of re-experiencing phenomenology in PTSD.
- Previous PTSD researchers ( Brett and Ostroff, 1985, Pollinger, Haas and Hendin, 
1986) have suggested that changes in the content of traumatic imagery may be used as 
a measure of clinical progress and therapeutic improvement. They suggest that 
changes reflecting greater control by an individual over traumatic events appear to be 
correlated with clinical improvement and that traumatic imagery is a useful yardstick 
of this.This cannot be evaluated however, until we use consistent definitions for re- 
experiencing phenomena and understand how different manifestations of traumatic 
imagery are related to each other, to the original trauma, and how these change over 
time. Further, work since 1989 using eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing 
techniques ( EMDR - Shapiro et al 1989,1990), suggests that if traumatic images can 
be successfully paired with neutral sensory stimuli, they can be quickly 
extinguished. If this is the case, it would be useful to understand the relationship 
between different types of traumatic imagery and their development over time. It is 
possible that some types of traumatic images are more amenable to EMDR. If this is 
so, it would be useful to be able to identify these early in treatment. The theoretical 
basis for EMDR, however, is unclear and cannot be fully formulated until re- 
experiencing phenomena themselves are more fully understood.
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TIMESCALES
May 1997 - July 1997 : Proposal accepted and Ethics approval sought.
July 1997 - Aug 1997 : Literature review paper completed.
Sept 1997 - Oct 1997 : Potential participants identified and invited to take part
Oct. 1997-March 1998: Data collection.
March 1998 - July 1998 : Data analysis and write up completed
ETHICAL APPROVAL
Application submitted to Greater Glasgow Community and Mental Health Services 
NHS Trust ethics committee.
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Re-experiencing in Post traumatic stress syndrome 
A Descriptive Analysis
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Abstract
Despite the fundamental theoretical role of symptoms of re-experiencing in the 
aetiology, maintenance and treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
phenomenological studies of what defines ‘re-experiencing’ are rarely reported.
This study used grounded theory methodology to explore and describe subjective 
accounts of re-experiencing symptomatology.
Eight male participants ( age range 30-60  years), receiving outpatient treatment for 
PTSD, were individually interviewed, once, using the clinician administered PTSD 
scale (CAPS). Original trauma type varied to include road traffic accidents (n=4), 
combat (n=2), assault (n=l) and robbery (n=l).
The characteristics of different types o f ‘re-experiencing’ arising from the data are 
described. Descriptive analysis focuses predominantly on the perceptual content and 
space/time orientation of re-experiencing phenomena. The Interacting Cognitive 
Subsystems Model is considered as a suitable theoretical framework, within which to 
understand the complexities of re-experiencing phenomena in PTSD.
Keywords : re-experiencing, imagery, PTSD.
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INTRODUCTION
PTSD, as defined by DSMIV ( APA, 1994 ), is a multisymptomatic disorder which 
requires varying numbers of symptoms from each of three categories of symptoms for 
diagnosis:- re-experiencing (1  symptom required), avoidance ( 3 symptoms required) 
and hyperarousal (2  symptoms required). Re-experiencing aspects of a traumatic 
event, by way of intrusive images, thoughts, feelings, perceptions and dreams, is 
therefore a prerequisite feature of PTSD.
Information processing theories of PTSD (Horowitz 1980,1986, Creamer et al, 1992) 
assume that re-experiencing occurs because traumatic memories are not processed and 
integrated at the time of the trauma because they are too distressing. They cannot be 
processed because they are incongruent with pre-existing schemata. Such theories 
postulate that this traumatic information is therefore held in an active memory system, 
which is not under conscious control, and is recurrently re-experienced and 
reprocessed until it becomes schema congruent and can then be stored in long term 
memory systems which are under conscious control. However, because re-experiences 
of the traumatic memories, which are associated with fear and hyperarousal, are 
themselves distressing, behavioural avoidance strategies develop to prevent their 
occurrence. An oscillation between re-experiencing, associated with hyperarousal and 
avoidance, thus characterises PTSD and continues until resolution occurs. Within this 
framework, the key to successful resolution of PTSD is rapid integration of the 
traumatic memories. Most treatment approaches to PTSD, therefore, include exposure 
to traumatic memories which are accessed by the exploration of re-experiencing 
phenomena ( Calhoun and Resick, 1993 ).
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Despite the fundamental theoretical role of re-experiencing in the aetiology, 
maintenance and treatment of PTSD, phenomenological studies of exactly what is 
meant by ‘re-experiencing’ are rarely reported in the literature ( Brewin, 1998). Since 
re-experiencing is a normal response immediately following trauma, and initial levels 
of intrusions are not predictive of PTSD development ( McFarlane, 1989 ), it is 
especially important that re-experiencing phenomena in PTSD are defined. In order to 
advance our knowledge about the course of PTSD, it would be useful to know at what 
stage, and how, intrusive images, thoughts, feelings, or dreams about a traumatic 
event, become pathological. Treatment can then be focused appropriately.
DSMIV describes re-experiencing phenomena within five different categories ( see 
Appendix 4.2 ). However, a person is required only to exhibit symptoms in one 
out of the five re-experiencing categories, to meet the diagnostic criterion for PTSD. 
Within this framework, recurrent dreams of a traumatic event are given equal 
weighting with recurrent, dissociative, ‘flashback’ type events. It is suggested ( see 
Chapter 2, Major Project Literature Review) that our understanding of these 
phenomena is limited if we accept the DSM IV proposition that intrusive memories, 
dreams, reliving experiences and physiological and psychological cued responses to 
reminders of the trauma, are equivalent expressions of the same ‘re-experiencing’ 
process. It is also suggested that there is a need for a deeper understanding of the 
whole spectrum of re-experiencing in order to progress theory development with 
respect to the role of these symptoms in PTSD. Such theoretical advances are required 
to inform clinical decisions about whether or not recurrent imagery should be a focus 
for treatment, and if so to identify which types of re-experience, which specific
si
images and which aspects of these images will be most amenable to change.
In this study an attempt is made to understand a small number of participants’re­
experiences within their own frame of reference, rather than testing a preconceived 
hypothesis on a larger sample. Qualitative methodology is utilised because it is 
generally concerned with exploring, understanding and describing the personal and 
social experiences of participants and trying to capture the meanings particular 
phenomena hold for them.
AIMS
This study aims to explore subjective accounts of re-experiencing phenomena 
in PTSD in order to describe the characteristics and content of ‘re-experiencing’ 
within this sample.
The following questions will be addressed :-
1) How frequently do the participants in this sample describe re-experiencing 
phenomena which meet criteria Bl - B5 as measured by the CAPS ?
Do participants in this sample tend to experience only one type, or more than one 
type of re-experience ?
Is intrusion type consistent within individuals during the course of their PTSD ?
2) How are re-experiencing phenomena, within the context of PTSD, described by the 
participants in this sample ? The phenomenology of a ‘reliving experience’, 
commonly termed ‘flashback’ is of particular interest. Is there a sense of perceptual 
re-experience of, as distinct from a vivid memory of, the traumatic stimuli ?
3) How closely does the stimuli content of the re-experience resemble the stimuli 
content of the original trauma ?
METHODS 
Research Design
This is an exploratory and descriptive study utilising a grounded theory approach 
( Strauss and Corbin, 1994, Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997) which allows for the 
preservation of the complexities of the data, so that its nature can be explored and 
better understood. The grounded theory approach is a widely used strategy for the 
analysis of qualitative data. It is fundamental to this approach that concepts and theory 
arise from the data. Qualitative research using this method, therefore, does not begin 
with a specific hypothesis to be tested, but with an area of study to be investigated, in 
this case subjective descriptions of re-experiencing phenomena. Theory and concepts 
are grounded in the data collected. It is the task of the researcher to extract these, 
thereby uncovering the participants’ own understanding and explanations. This design 
is appropriate when the focus of the study is on exploratory questions ( ie how do 
people ‘re-experience’ traumatic events, which information is re-experienced and in 
what modality ? ), when the researcher has little control over events ( ie the study 
involves no manipulation of people or variables ) and when the focus of the study is 
on some real life phenomenon (ie reaction to trauma).
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Measures
Beck Depression Inventory ( B D I) ( Beck et al, 1961 )
This is an extensively used, 21 item, self report inventory, for measuring degree of 
depressive symptomatology. This inventory has a split-half reliability coefficient of 
0.93. Internal consistency is high ( Cronbach’s coefficient alpha : psychiatric sample =
0.86, non-psychiatric sample= 0.81). Content, discriminant, construct, concurrent and 
factorial validity has been demonstrated ( Beck, Steer and Garbin, 1988 ).
State - Trait Anxiety Inventory ( STAI) ( Spielberger et al, 1970 )
This is a widely used 40 item self report questionnaire which contains 20 items to 
assess state anxiety and 20 items to assess trait anxiety. Test-retest reliability for trait 
anxiety is 0.81 and for state anxiety is 0.40. Internal consistency is high ( Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients range from 0.83 - 0.92 for both state and trait anxiety scales in the 
normative sample). Construct, concurrent and discriminant validity has been 
demonstrated ( Spielberger et al, 1970).
Impact of Events Scale ( IES ) ( Horowitz et al, 1979 )
This is a widely used 15 item self report scale of subjective distress related to a 
specific traumatic incident. This measure has two subscales, intrusion and avoidance. 
Respondents are asked to indicate on a four point scale (not at all, rarely, sometimes, 
or often) how frequently they have experienced each item during the previous week. 
The split-half reliability of the IES has been shown to be relatively high (r = 0.86) as 
has test-retest reliability ( r = 0.87). The internal consistency of the subscales is also
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high ( Cronbach’s alpha : intrusion = 0.78, avoidance = 0.82 ). Validity and sensitivity 
to clinical change have been demonstrated ( Horowitz et al, 1979 ).
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale ( CAPS - D X ) ( Blake et al, 1996 )
This is a recent, 30 item, clinician administered scale in an interview format. It 
includes items which assess each of the 17 core symptoms that constitute the DSM IV 
defined construct of PTSD, as well as items which assess clinically associated features 
( eg guilt, impact upon functioning etc.). The CAPS quantifies symptom frequency 
and intensity for each of the criteria. Good internal consistency has been shown on 
each of the three subscales ( Cronbachs alpha: numbing and avoidance = 0.85, re- 
experiencing = 0.77 and hyperarousal = 0.73 ). Moderate concurrent validity with 
other established measures of PTSD has been demonstrated.
Since the aim of this study was to generate a rich set of descriptive data with which to 
explore the phenomemology of re-experiencing, the CAPS was utilised as an aid to 
‘directed conversation’, as well as a measure of PTSD symptomatology.Participants 
were encouraged to give full, narrative answers to the interview questions and 
clarification or further detail was frequently sought by the investigtor. Although the 
CAPS was considered to be a good starting point, the investigator was aware of the 
tension between the risk of overly directive interviewing, which can cut off interesting 
theoretical leads and unwittingly load assumptions into the questions asked, and the 
risk of losing sight of any focus by not constraining the interview at all.
Participants
All participants were recruited from Clinical Psychology outpatient clinics in the
Greater Glasgow Area. Clinical Psychologists were asked to identify adults ( aged 18- 
65), currently in treatment with them for symptoms of PTSD, to describe the study to 
them and to give written information and a consent form to those who were willing to 
participate. Written consent and contact information was then returned directly to the 
investigator.
Eight participants currently receiving outpatient treatment for PTSD were included in 
this study. A sample size of 8 - 20 participants is common in qualitative studies 
involving a single extensive interview (Turpin et al, 1997). All participants were 
male, and although females were not excluded, none were recruited, Ages ranged 
from 30 years to 60 years 6 months. PTSD developed subsequent to a road traffic 
accident ( RTA) in four participants, combat related trauma in two participants, 
assault in one participant and a post office robbery in one participant. Co-morbidity 
was not an exclusion factor. Scores on standard measures of depression (BDI), anxiety 
(STAI) and PTSD severity (EES and CAPS) are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1 Sample mean scores on standard measures
BDI STAI IES CAPS
State Trait
Mean 19 39 50 37 75
Standard Deviation +/- 8.7 +/-15.6 +/-14.2 +/-15.7 +/-21
Range 2 - 3 0 21-68 29-65 3-61 31-97
Sample means indicate a moderate level of depression and trait anxiety within this 
sample. All participants met DSM IV criteria for lifetime PTSD, as assessed by the 
CAPS, and all but one met criteria for current PTSD. The participant who did not, 
participant 8, did not do so because he experienced only 2/7 avoidance symptoms (3
are required for PTSD diagnosis). He experienced 4/5 re-experiencing symptoms 
however (1 is required for PTSD diagnosis). His IES score was 35 ( I = 18, A = 17), 
which suggests a significant level of both intrusive and avoidance symptoms.
Procedure 
Data collection
Eight male participants, recruited from Clinical Psychology outpatient clinics, were 
interviewed once only, by a single researcher, using the CAPS structured interview 
schedule. Free narrative was encouraged by seeking further detail and clarification to 
replies given to the CAPS question. Interviews lasted between 1-1.5 hours, depending 
upon the talkativeness of the respondent, and were audiotaped with permission. 
Participants were asked to complete the BDI, STAI and IES self- report measures at 
the end of the interview. The audiotaped interviews provided the raw data for analysis.
Data storage
Audiotapes were labelled with participant number ( eg P I ) and stored securely 
together with CAPS, BDI, STAI, and IES data. Initial data selection was 
undertaken by the researcher who listened to each tape and extracted all responses 
associated with the description of re-experiencing phenomena. Verbatim accounts of 
narrative describing ‘re-experiencing’ were extracted and transcribed by the 
interviewer. 256 passages of text were extracted in total ( Mean = 32, range = 20-44 
per participant). Only data describing the content of re-experiences was further 
analysed, data describing triggers or responses, to the re-experience, was not analysed
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further. 180 passages of transcribed text describing the content of re-experiencing 
phenomena were therefore selected. The decision about whether selected text 
described trigger, content or response information was made by the same single 
researcher and is therefore subject to bias. Data segments were then coded and 
categorised.
Coding
The aim of a grounded theory approach at this stage of analysis, is to seek similarities 
and diversities within the data, which may point to the various facets of a potentially 
significant concept. Understanding of each concept emerges from the interplay (ie 
process of constant comparison) between the researcher’s interpretations and variation 
within the body of data.
Initial coding involved the tentative development and labelling of concepts and 
categories within the selected text. Once again the judgement of the researcher is 
integral to the labelling process. Each label, eg ‘perception - smell’, was recorded at 
the top of an A4 page. A precis of the data of interest, together with a specific 
transcript reference was noted on the appropriate category page. It was possible for the 
same piece of data to be recorded under more than one category heading. This 
categorisation process is summarised in Figure 1.
All data relating to the content of re-experiencing was analysed. A selection of data, 
comprising 15 passages of verbatim data, was selected by the researcher to be coded 
by an independent clinical psychologist who was not involved in the data collection 
process. The independent assessor was presented with each of the verbatim text
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extracts, selected by the researcher to be of mixed difficulty to categorise, and the 
category labels (as shown in Figure 1) and asked to assign one or more appropriate 
label(s) to the data. This was an attempt to ensure that the emergent categories were 
useful and that interpretation was consistent. Consensus was reached on the 
assignation of all category labels except ‘somatic re-enactment’. This led to a 
discussion regarding the categorisation of narrative which included references to 
physical phenomena. Physical signs and symptoms eg sweating, nausea, headache, 
were categorised by the researcher as ‘responses to’ rather than ‘content o f  re- 
experiencing phenomena and were not therefore analysed further. However, this is a 
difficult, and possibly arbitrary, differentiation to make. It is possible that conditioned 
physical signs and symptoms could be trigger, content and/or response elements 
within a re-experience. Consider the following verbatim extract describing the re­
experience of an RTA upon waking from sleep:-
P6 : ‘ In the crash, when you are in the vehicle, looking out o f the vehicle, the
smoke makes you claustrophobic, and like weeks ago, when I  was waking up and
smelling the smoke and all that, it was... oops, straight to the window ...but now i f  it 
happens you know what it is... ’
Researcher : ‘ So you would actually go and open the window., was that to try and let 
the smell out ? ’
P6 : '....No you 'dgo to the window, you weren 7 caring about the smell getting out,
you were more interested in you getting air...what *s behind you, you're not bothered
about right at that second you need cold air to breathe.. ’
Is the claustrophobia, desire for fresh air, and actual movement towards the window,
so
described here, a somatic re-enactment, ie reliving the psychological and 
physiological traumatic stimuli of being trapped in a burning car, or is this a 
psychological and physiological panic response to the imagery content ?
The role of physical signs and symptoms within re-experiencing needs further 
exploration. It was agreed that this particular example should be categorised as a 
somatic re-enactment, because of the reference to \ . what's behind you...' ie the 
burning car (as if it was there in present time, rather than a memory of the burning 
car). However, it was agreed that within the confines of the current study, where it 
was unclear, these physical elements would be categorised as ‘responses’ eg.
‘....A horrific bang...a noise that...oh, it turns your stomach when you think o f  it... ’
(P6)
It is possible that the physical stomach turning described here, also happened during 
the actual RTA ( fear response), thus suggesting a categorisation of ‘content of ’ re­
experience, however ‘ ....when you think o f  it.... ’ suggests that it is a response to 
thinking about the noise. It is the noise therefore which is categorised as the content of 
the re-experience.
These examples highlight the difficulties inherent in this study which because of 
practical constraints did not allow for more than one researcher. The difficulties of 
initial data selection are demonstrated. This study limited itself to exploring ‘content 
of ’ re-experiencing phenomena, however the distinction between, trigger, content, 
and response is dependent upon the researcher’s opinion and therefore bias. Study 
design would be scientifically more robust if more than one researcher was involved
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in the initial data selection stage, as well as the later categorisation stages.
Core analysis
Analysis proceeds by linking and refining the emergent categories and concepts. This 
is a circular rather than linear process, initial concepts and categories arise from the 
data and are modified by comparing, contrasting and creating links between them, 
supported by the data. The aim is to integrate the categories by creating links between 
them, e.g. sensory content within a re-experience is commonly described in this 
sample. This occurs across modality ie visual, auditory, taste, smell, touch, pain, 
which are sub-categories of sensory perception. Links between these categories 
suggests that this may occur as either a ‘real’ sensory perception ie experiencing it via 
the sensory organ, or as a ‘minds eye’ perception.
RESULTS
Frequency of different types of re-experiencing as measured by the CAPS
7/8 participants in this study each described current re-experiencing symptomatology 
to fit each DSM IV category as measured by the CAPS. In these participants, all types 
of intrusion were consistently experienced throughout the course of their PTSD. 
Participant 8 described current re-experiencing phenomena in all categories except 
trauma related dream imagery. However, he did experience this immediately 
following his trauma (RTA). This result was unexpected and suggests that it may be 
more common than previous reports suggest ( reviewed by Hodgkinson and Stewart, 
1989 ) for individuals to simultaneously experience all the different types of re-
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experiencing ( ie DSM IV criteria B1-B5 ) during the course of their PTSD. This may 
however, be due to varying methodologies and definitions across studies and 
highlights the need for further research into the definitions of, natural history of and 
relationships between, re-experiencing phenomena.
Descriptions of re-experiencing phenomena
Based on the descriptions of the participants in this study, four types of re- 
experiencing can be described (see Table 2 ).
Table 2 Types of Re-experiencing
Type Conscious
State
Space/Time
Orientation
Occurrence
outwith
PTSD?
1 Memory Conscious Fully
orientated
Yes
2 Dream Unconscious Variable 
orientation 
within 
dream.Fully 
orientated on 
waking
Yes
3 Hynogogic/
Hypnocampic
Imagery
Semi­
conscious
Disorientated 
in space/time
Yes
4 Reliving
experience
Conscious Disorientated 
in space/time. 
Maybe 
processing 
information in 
different 
space/time 
orientations
No
Re-experiencing phenomena are described by the participants in this study,
eo
predominantly in terms of sensory information associated with fear, experienced 
within various space/time orientations. This sensory information most commonly 
directly replicates sensory perceptions of actual stimuli experienced during the 
original trauma. However, sensory perceptions offeared stimuli, not experienced 
during the original trauma, (ie pseudomemories ) are also described, suggesting that 
the sensory information within the re-experience has been constructed during some 
initial processing of the traumatic stimuli.
Content of reported sensory experiences
Re-experiencing phenomena in this small sample contained perceptual images from 
each sensory domain (see Table 3). Examples are provided in Appendix 4.3. All re- 
experiences contained both visual and auditory imagery.
Table 3 Frequency of perceptual imagery in re-experiencing
SENSORY DOMAIN % OF SAMPLE
Visual 100% (n=8)
Auditory 100% (n -  8)...............
Olfactory 50% ( n - 4 )
Pain 37.5% (n = 3)
Taste 25% ( n - 2 )
Tactile 12.5% ( n - 1 )
Sensory re-experiences are described in two ways :-
1) “ Mind’s eve 55 images ( ie ‘what we hear / see in our heads’ ).
These are described during waking and dream states in the context of ‘remembering5 
rather than ‘reliving5 re-experiences. Knowledge that the image derives from past 
rather than present stimuli is inherent e.g.
“ I  can see things, they 're not there, they 're in my mind, I  can see them but... ”(P5)
2) Present time sensory perceptions ( ie‘what we sense in the world, happening now’ ) 
These are described in the context of ‘reliving’ re-experiences only, as if the stimulus 
is recurring in present time e.g.
“7 can see everything, he is just lying there that part has gone..there is a massive
pool o f blood..... black... I ike crude oil. he is just lying there ” (P6)
“ I see his motor turning, I  see the woman screaming. I  can hear the woman
screaming... ” (P6)
3/8 participants also reported re-experiencing physical pain stimuli, replicating that of 
the original trauma, within ‘reliving’ type re-experiences e.g.
“as i f  it is happening again..I can feel the pains in my legs,the pains in my head, the 
pains in my arms,..I am reliving it. ” (P3)
Different formats of presentation of the re-experiencing were described, although the 
significance of the difference is unclear. They are described as occurring within :-
a) specific, recurrent still images and / or
b) video like - normal speed and / or
c) video like - slow motion and / or
d) video like - rewind, normal speed. ( see Appendix 4.4 for examples )
Orientation in Space and Time
The variation in descriptions of orientation in space and time seems to define the 
different types of re-experiencing phenomena described in this sample. Maintenance 
of space/time orientation is associated with descriptions of ‘remembering’ type
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experiences. Space/time disorientation is associated with ‘reliving’ type experiences. 
In this small sample there were no exceptions. Re-experiences during dreams, are 
associated with disorientation on waking, when the dream contained ‘relived’ 
elements of the trauma which wake the dreamer up. Imagery in the period between 
wakefulness and sleep (hypnogogic) and between sleep and waking (hypnocampic) is 
of the reliving type in this sample. There is potential for confusion in categorising this 
type of re-experience because the type of imagery experienced in these states is often 
described as a ‘dream’. However, ‘reliving’ experiences themselves are not difficult to 
distinguish. Descriptive language was very consistent across participants and involved 
the following phrases :- 
"....it's like being there right now ” (PI)
"....Ifelt as i f  I  was there.. ” (P3)
"....It’s as i f  I ’m there again ” (P4)
"....It ’s as i f  it ’s actually happening ” (P5)
"....It was really as though I  was there again ” (.PI)
There is also some suggestion of disorientation whilst actually describing the re­
experiences. Long pauses during the narrative were observed where participants 
appeared to lose concentration whilst attempting to describe their experiences 
suggesting delays in information processing, e.g.
"..the policeman said ‘we have just had a report that your colleague has been taken
hostage..aye...I'll. and like em the em...........I ’m Vm  right, 77/
just tell you exactly what happened\ right ?. ” (P7)
"At night you lie and you see it..............you see it.................. you see it...............you
see it...............and you 're like that, ‘ come on, get your head together, you don't want
to see that.. ” (P6j
At one point during the interview with participant 4, a helicopter flew overhead. He 
reported that this triggered an immediate reliving experience during the interview.
This was not associated with any observable behaviour change. He reported 
“I just heard a helicopter flying overhead there and I  thought I  was in Northern 
Ireland right aw ay.... I  was sitting in the base waiting for a chopper to go out on
patrol. When I  am here I'm  actually in the two places at the same time... I  am in
Northern Ireland, but I  am speaking to you about the subject you are asking me about 
at the time,. " (P4)
It is interesting that participant 4 says “ ..I AM  in Northern Ireland ". This may 
suggest that he was processing information simultaneously in two different space/time 
frames ie past, service in N. Ireland, and present, interview in Glasgow, both of which 
made individual sense. The trigger of the helicopter noise was apparently processed in 
both orientations for participant 4 to be immediately able to understand his experience 
and relate it to the interviewer. It is also noteworthy that the word ‘helicopter’ is used 
in relation to the interview situation, but the word ‘chopper’, army slang, is used in the 
next phrase, in relation to the ‘reliving’ Northern Ireland situation.
Relationship of re-experience content to original trauma content
All participants described re-experiences of all types, in which the content mirrors the 
exact content of an aspect of the original traumatic event. 3/8 participants also report 
recurrent, intrusive images of feared, rather than actual, traumatic events, ie the re­
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experience content was different from that of the original traumatic event. This 
phenomenon has been reported in the literature previously ( Burstein, 1985,1986, 
Bryant, 1996) and has been termed ‘ pseudomemory\
Participant 4, a Northern Ireland combat veteran, described recurrent dream imagery 
of himself being blown up in a car bomb explosion. The content of the dream 
replicated exactly, an actual incident in which he was involved, except that in that 
case the bomb was successfully defused. His imagery, therefore, is of a feared, rather 
than actual, outcome. The dream image, of himself being blown up, has also become 
an intrusive and distressing memory ( the dream resulting from the trauma, not the 
trauma per se, therefore, appears to be the subject of the re-experience).
Participant 5, also a Northern Ireland combat veteran, described recurrent nightmares 
of being shot by a sniper. Although this never actually happened to him it was a 
constant threat. The dream was described as having a ‘reliving’ quality, in that the 
shot is heard and the pain of the impact is felt upon waking, and there is 
disorientation, in that the dreamer is confused about whether he is alive or dead.
It is interesting that in both of these veterans, who were repeatedly exposed to work 
associated traumatic stimuli, recurrent imagery based on feared stimuli is more 
distressing than that based on their actual traumatic experiences. A ‘reporter’ like 
style was adopted by both participants, especially participant 4, to describe their 
experiences, which may suggest that through training ( ie development of appropriate 
expectancy schemata) these soldiers were able to distance themselves emotionally 
from actual, combat related, traumatic events but were unable to do so with their 
fears. It is also pertinent that neither veteran became symptomatic until leaving
67
Northern Ireland.
Participant 7 described recurrent visual images of his colleague with a gun in his 
mouth, taken hostage during a post office raid. He was involved in a P.O. raid and was 
mistakenly told by a policeman that his colleague had been taken hostage. A couple of 
minutes later he was told that this was in fact incorrect, his colleague had not been 
taken hostage and nobody had been hurt. This original image, however, has been 
resistant to change and has been re-experienced for three years. It was observed that 
participant 7 kept his eyes tight shut for the duration of this description. His reason for 
this suggested orientation difficulties whilst trying to describe this image.
“..It ’.s' not as though I'm  trying to remember it.....Ijust get lost in it somehow it's
as i f  I'm  kinda there, it ’s em i t ’s as though my mind is kinda there somehow, you
know..?” (P7)
Loss of confidence in own judgement ability
It is noteworthy that 4/8 participants suggest that they have suffered a loss of 
confidence in their own judgement ability, e.g.
“...you don *t know i f  you are sleeping or not, you don’t know i f  you are thinking or
dreaming, that wasn V real, or was it real ? that’s where the fear comes
from.... is this happening or am I  dreaming it ? ” (P6)
"... I  find  it impossible to stand back from this, I ’m talking about the whole thing, 
...trying to understand it, ....my critical values are just all away. ” (P7)
This is described not as a result of their trauma per se, but as a result of re- 
experiencing traumatic imagery. Vivid, sensory perceptions of stimuli from past 
trauma, may be associated with a loss of trust in fundamental, perceptual processes 
and subsequent judgemental ability. A confusion is described between deciding what 
is ‘real’, ie actually happening now, and what is ‘not real5, ie not actually happening 
now, but perceived as if it is. It is this confusion which seems to be associated with a 
loss of confidence.
DISCUSSION
Intrusive thoughts and images ( DSM IV, criterion B 1 ) are associated with normal 
anxiety resolution processes ( Marks, 1990 ) and have been linked specifically with 
obsessive compulsive disorder ( reviewed by DeSilva 1986 ) and more recently with 
depression ( Brewin et al, 1996 ), as well as with PTSD. Dreams ( criterion B2 ), 
although still poorly understood, have long been accepted to occur as part of normal 
anxiety resolution processes ( Seligman, 1987). Reliving experiences ( criterion B3 ) 
are not associated with normal anxiety resolution processes and occur only in PTSD. 
Psychological ( criteron B4 ) and physiological ( criterion B5 ) cued responses to 
reminders of the trauma are well understood in terms of conditioned responses to any 
aversive stimuli ( Brown and Kulik, 1977, Kolb and Mutalipassi, 1982). It is perhaps 
confusing for these conditioned arousal states to be included as separate categories of 
re-experiencing in PTSD since they occur within memories, dreams and reliving 
experiences and therefore are not mutually exclusive. Reliving re-experiences then, 
during which sensory stimuli which replicate traumatic stimuli are perceived ‘as if the
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trauma were happening again’ seem to be the only re-experiencing phenomena which 
occur exclusively in PTSD.
In this study reliving re-experiences are described in association with fundamental 
changes in self perception and trust in one’s own perceptual judgement to the extent 
of being unsure of one’s own conscious state. Participants described difficulties in 
deciding whether they were awake or asleep, thinking or dreaming, and even alive or 
dead, following reliving re-experiences. Within an information processing framework 
then, this may suggest that following a traumatic experience, it is not only the new 
traumatic stimuli which are incongruent with pre-existing schemata, but also pre­
existing, basic schemata, eg knowledge of consciousness, sensory perception, which 
become disorganised and are unable to consistently interpret ‘everyday’ stimuli. 
Pseudomemories, in which the image content is of an imagined rather than actual, 
traumatic experience, have been described infrequently in the literature (Burstein, 
1985, Bryant, 1996 ). However, 3/8 participants described them in this study, a higher 
incidence than expected. Again, this may be due to definition difficulties, 
Pseudomemories seem to challenge information processing theories of PTSD. If 
traumatic stimuli are held in an active memory buffer, outwith conscious control 
( Horowitz, 1980,1986 ), then the theory predicts that the content o f ‘re-experiences’, 
based on repetition of the stimuli in the buffer, should replicate these stimuli exactly. 
The existence of pseudomemories suggests that images of expected outcomes, 
presumably based on existing fear networks and expectancy schemata (Foa et al, 1989, 
Creamer et al, 1992 ), rather than actual outcomes, based on sensory perception, 
replace trauma stimuli in active memory, and it is these which are re-experienced.
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A more complex model such as an Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) approach 
(Teasdale and Barnard, 1993) may offer an appropriate framework for understanding 
re-experiencing phenomena within PTSD. Nine subsystems of mental codes dealing 
with specific types of information are proposed within the ICS which both store and 
transform cognitive and affective information (see Table 4 ).
Table 4 Summary of mental codes within the ICS
IN  FORMA TION CODE SUBSYSTEM INFORMA TION CONTENT
SENSORY ACOUSTIC what we ‘hear in the world’
VISUAL what we ‘see in the world’
BODY STATE taste,smell,touch,kinaesthetic
STRUCTURAL MORPHONOLEXICAL what we ‘hear in the head’
DESCRIPTION
OBJECT what we ‘see in the head’
MEANING PROPOSITIONAL ‘knowing that....’ specific facts
IMPLICATIONAL schematic models of
experience
EFFECTOR ARTICULATORY subvocal speech output
LIMB ‘mental’ physical movement
The development of the processes which transform the stored information depends 
upon the accumulated experience of the system and each subsystem can interact with 
the other subsystems allowing dynamic interplay. Information related to a trauma may 
be represented in patterns of several different codes therefore representations related 
to the trauma in one code, can have functional relationships that are quite different to 
those of related representations in other codes. This would allow for images to be 
created as a response to initial traumatic stimuli which maintain the context of a 
traumatic situation, but include elements of feared, rather than actual, perceptual
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stimuli. This framework also allows for the occurrence of delayed onset PTSD which 
is difficult to explain using more simplistic and traditional models. It can also explain 
the simultaneous occurrence of the same perceptual stimuli but within the different 
contexts of memories, dreams or reliving re-experiences. It would, perhaps, be 
interesting to explore re-experiencing phenomena to a content analysis based on the 
ICS mental code system.
CONCLUSION
Re-experiencing in PTSD is a complex and multidimensional process and qualitative 
methods can be utilised to explore this complexity. Although it is not possible to draw 
firm conclusions from a sample of eight participants, it has been possible to begin to 
describe re-experiencing phenomena in terms of their perceptual content and 
space/time orientation within this sample.
All participants in this study have experienced all five types of re-experiencing 
( ie DSMIV, criterion B1-B5 ), during the course of their PTSD. All except one 
participant, who no longer described experiencing recurrent trauma related dreams, 
described re-experiences in all DSM IV categories at the time of interview. This 
suggests that it is more common for people to experience different types of re- 
experiencing phenomena concurrently, rather than to experience just one type, or one 
type at a time.
Descriptions from this sample suggest that ‘reliving experiences’, commonly termed 
‘flashbacks’, are consistently associated with a sense of perceptual re-experience of 
stimuli which were reported to occur during the actual trauma, but are perceived to
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occur in present time, ie ‘....as if (a perceptual aspect of the trauma) was happening 
again, now..’. These are distinct from vivid memories, which can be sensory images, 
but within the space/time framework that this is something which has already 
happened. Reliving experiences, which awaken the participant, are described to occur 
during dreams. However, it is often unclear whether these are dreams occurring during 
sleep, or hypnogogic/hypnocampic images occurring between sleep and wakefulness. 
All participants in this study described re-experiences in which stimuli content exactly 
replicated those described within the actual trauma. However, 3/8 participants also 
reported pseudomemories in which stimuli occurring within the re-experience seemed 
to have been constructed from a feared, rather than actual event. This was a surprising 
result and may suggest that pseudomemories are more common than the literature 
suggests.
Data analysis in this study was constrained to exploration of the content of re- 
experiencing , however, the content of re-experiencing cannot be fully understood 
outwith the preceding triggers and resultant responses associated with it. Processing of 
the memory of the re-experience itself, and the effects this has upon future re- 
experiencing, also needs to be explored in order to understand the role of re- 
experiencing in the development, maintenance and ultimately treatment 
of, PTSD.
Two decades after the introduction of PTSD into DSM III re-experiencing 
phenomena are still poorly understood. It is suggested that basic phenomenological 
information is needed before theory formulation can advance.
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Qualitative research methods are utilised in an attempt to move research towards a 
greater realism (and hence validity), however this can be at the expense of reliability. 
Qualitative methods are often criticised for lacking scientific rigour ( Mays & Pope, 
1995 ). The most common criticisms are>
1. These methods are strongly subject to researcher bias.
2. These methods can lack reproducibility - ie the research data is so dependent upon 
the perceptions and interpretations of the researcher that there is no guarantee that a 
different researcher would not come to radically different conclusions.
3. These methods lack generalisability.
Researcher bias
This study relies exclusively on the observation, interpretation and analysis of a single 
researcher, and is, therefore, subject to researcher bias. An attempt was made to 
enhance the reliability of the study by asking an independent assessor to categorise a 
selection of data. However, this process was still subject to researcher bias because the 
sample of data to be categorised and the list of potential category labels, was selected 
by the researcher in the first instance.
Reliability could have been improved by having more than one researcher involved in 
the process of data selection so that a consensus could have been reached with regard 
to the initial ‘content of re-experiencing phenomena’ dataset. Ideally, full interview 
transcripts could be analysed for content and structure by both the researcher and an 
independent panel of assessors. The level of agreement could then be assessed and
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reported. Although this was not practically possible within the confines of this study, 
this process can be aided by the use of computer packages. Software is available to 
facilitate the analysis of the content of interview transcripts. A coding frame can be 
developed to characterise each utterance ( eg participant identifier, age, sex, topic, 
word usage e tc) and transcripts can then be coded by more than one researcher. 
Audiotapes can then be used for subsequent analysis by independent assessors. QSR 
NUD*IST (Qualitative Solutions in Research, Non-numerical Unstructured Data 
Indexing Searching and Theorisng) is an example of such software. This system 
allows the data to be stored and indexed in such a way that the index system develops 
as the category structure emerges from the data. However, although this type of 
system sounds very promising, and would be useful for the amount of data generated 
within this study, it is still only as good as the original data collected, the design of the 
coding frame and the skill and judgement of the programmer.
Interview process
The CAPS interview schedule, based on the theoretical assumptions of DSM IV, was 
selected in an attempt to structure the initial interview, whilst at the same time 
allowing for free narrative, as well as quantifying PTSD in an attempt to reliably 
describe the sample. However, this may have also limited the data made available by 
the participants during the interview. The aim of the qualitative research interview is 
to discover the participants own framework of meaning. As far as possible it is 
important not to impose a priori categories and concepts from the researcher’s own 
professional knowledge onto the process of data collection. However, the CAPS
7S
interview schedule asks about re-experiencing phenomena directly, in terms of its’
Bl - B5 categories, and therefore does impose some a priori structure upon the data 
collection.
The effect of the interview process itself, upon the validity of the data collected, 
should also be considered. Data was collected by a single interviewer, during a single 
interview. Although this may be advantageous with regard to consistency and 
coherence within the interviewing process, the rigour of the study ultimately depends 
upon the integrity and judgement of the researcher. It is not possible for the 
researcher to answer the following questions objectively : Is the same degree of 
direction given to each participant ? What are the effects of leading questions ? How 
significant is the level of rapport ? Were participants given enough time to explain 
their viewpoint ? How did the researcher decide which information to follow up and 
which to ignore ? Hence, it is not possible for the researcher to assess and clearly 
report the effect they themselves have upon the interview outcome, and thus the data 
collected.
Presentation of account
Reliability in qualitative research depends upon producing a convincing account and 
can easily be compromised by its’ presentation. The sheer volume of data can be 
difficult to summarise and to present ‘objectively’. Enough of the original evidence 
needs to be systematically presented within the original account, so that the reader can 
be satisfied of the relationship between the interpretation and the evidence. The author 
hoped to try and address this problem by including identifiable verbatim examples 
within the account. However, once again these have been selected by the author to
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illustrate her own interpretations and are therefore subject to bias.
Qualitative accounts are predominantly narrative in character and often do not sit 
easily within the traditional framework of a scientific paper. Although it is necessary 
to present the research in a way which allows the reader to follow the process of data 
collection, analysis and interpretation, the demarcation between ‘results’ and 
‘discussion’ is not as clear as in quantitative enquiry. ‘Results’ in qualitative enquiry 
are, by definition, interpretations and cannot be clearly presented, outwith the context 
of a discussion of the rationale for their interpretation.
Comparison of grounded theory and content analysis 
The aim of this study was to describe subjective accounts of re-experiencing 
phenomena within PTSD. Grounded theory methodology was selected because it 
aims to generate definitions, concepts and ultimately theory which is generated 
inductively from data provided by a purposive sample, of relevant cases. Content 
analysis is an alternative method of qualitative analysis which can also be used in 
descriptive studies. It differs from grounded theory in that the aim of content analysis 
is to record the frequency of pre-defmed concepts within the data set, whereas the aim 
of grounded theory is to seek similarities and diversities within the data, which 
indicate the different facets of a previously undefined, potentially significant, 
concept ( Pigeon & Henwood, 1996 ). Both approaches can be complimentary, 
however, eg using a content analysis technique in this study, 3/8 participants were 
identified as describing ‘pseudomemories’, an uncommon, but pre-defined concept 
identified within the PTSD literature. Content analysis is also a useful method of 
subsequent research, which can be used to explore specific concepts which have
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arisen from grounded theory research.
Conclusion
The written account of research using qualitative methods is integral to the evaluation 
of the research itself. Only through the narrative account can the reader evaluate the 
rigour, and hence scientific worth of the study. The role of the researcher as a 
‘research instrument’ also needs to be explicit in the account to address issues of 
reliability. However, this cannot be done objectively if the researcher is interviewer, 
sole data analyst and author.
Qualitative methods are useful in that they can generate rich and contextually 
meaningful data. The challenge however, is how best to analyse and summarise such 
data using non-numerical language, and to communicate the findings clearly and 
transparently.
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APPENDIX 1:2
GP Satisfaction Questionnaire
Lomond Healthcare NHS Trust Clinical Psychology Service 
Audit of attitudes of General Practitioners
N am e:
Date :
Practice Code :
1) Over the last 12 months approximately how many patients have you referred to 
clinical psychology ?
More than 10 
Between 5 and 10 
Less than 5
2) Would you like to be able to refer more patients ?
Yes
No
Don’t know
3) If you would like to refer more patients, or have decided not to, do any of the 
following apply ? ( please tick as many boxes as appropriate ).
Waiting time too long
Lack of capacity for urgent referrals
Psychologist not on site
Don’t know psychologist
Don’t think psychologist can help
Unsure if referral is appropriate
Not enough psychology sessions
Patient unwilling to attend
No choice of psychologist
4) Which ones of the following would you regard as an acceptable waiting time for a 
first appointment with a clinical psychologist ?
Non-urgent patients 2 weeks urgent patients 1 week
4 weeks 
6 weeks 
8 weeks 
10 weeks 
12 weeks
2 weeks
3 weeks
4 weeks
5) Once the patient has been referred , do you receive sufficient information about :
a) Waiting time too much
satisfactory 
too little
b) Initial assessment, formulation and proposed treatment too much
satisfactory 
too little
c) Progress of treatment too much
satisfactory 
too little
d) Termination and discharge too much
satisfactory 
too little
e) Non attendance by patients too much
satisfactory 
too little
6) What kind of written communication do you find helpful ?
Long detailed reports 
Short reports with headings 
Brief letters on one page
7) Is the Clinical Psychology service provided sufficiently local for your patients ?
Yes
No
8) On the whole how have you regarded the Clinical Psychology service you have 
received ?
Positively 
Negatively 
Mixed Feelings
9) Do you have any other comments you would like to make ? If so please write in 
space below :
Thankyou very much for your cooperation. Please return in the SAE provided.
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1. Send o n ly  hard c o p y  w hen  first su b m itt in g  your paper.
2. W h en  you r  paper has been refereed, revised if  necessary an d  accepted, send  a disk c o n t a in in g  the final 
version with the final hard c o p y .  M a k e  sure that the disk and the hard copy  match e x a c t ly .
3. Specify  w hat  so f tw a re  w as  used , includ ing  which release, e.g. W ordPerfect  5.1.
4. Specify  w hat  c o m p u te r  was used (either IB M -com pat ib le  PC or A pple  M acin tosh ) .
5. Include the text file and  separate  table and illustration files, if  available.
6. T h e  file sh o u ld  fo l lo w  the general instructions on style arrangement and. in particular ,  the  reference  
style o f  this jo ur na l  as g iven  b e lo w .
7. T h e  file sh ou ld  be s ing le -spaced  a n d  should  use the w rap-around en d -o f- l ine  feature, i.e. n o  returns at 
the end o f  each  line. All textual e lem en ts  should begin flush left: no  paragraph in d e n ts .  Place two  
returns after every e lem en t  su ch  a s  title, headings, paragraphs, figure and table c a l l -o u ts .
8. K eep  a back-up  disk for reference and safety.
T h e  art icles subm itted  m ust  c o n ta in  original material which has not been published a n d  which  is not  
being considered  for p u b lic a t ion  e lsew h ere .  Papers accepted by Behaviour R esearch  and T h e r a p y  m ay not  be 
published  e lsew here in a n y  lan gu age  w i th o u t  the consent  o f  the Editor.
T h e  title o f  the paper,  the a uthor 's  n a m e  and surname and the name and address o f  the inst i tu te ,  hospita l  
etc. where the w o rk  was carried ou t .  s h o u ld  be indicated at the top o f  the paper. W here p o ss ib le ,  the Fax  
num ber  o f  the corresponding author s h o u ld  be supplied with the manuscript,  for use by the publisher .
Su m m aries .  A  su m m a ry ,  not e x cee d in g  20 0  words, should be subm itted on a separate sheet in dup licate .  The  
s u m m a r y  will appear at the b eg in n ing  o f  the  article.
K e yw o r d s .  A u th o r s  sh o u ld  include up to  six keywords with their article. T he  contro l led  list o f  keyw ords is 
based  o n  the A P A  list o f  index d escrip tors ,  however, authors m ay include o n e  or tw o  a d d it io n a l  ’free' 
k eyw ord s  i f  they w ish to d o  so.
R eferences  sh o u ld  be prepared ca refu l ly  using the Publication M anual  o f  the A m er ica n  P sych o log ica l  
A ssoc ia t ion  for style.  T h e y  sh ou ld  be p laced  on a separate sheet at the end o f  the paper,  d o u b le - s p a c e d ,  and  in 
a lphabetica l  order.
R eferences sh ou ld  be q u o te d  in the text  by giving the author's name, fo llow ed by the year, e .g .  (H ersen  and  
Barlow. 1976) or Hersen and B a r lo w  (1976) .
For m o re  than two  au th ors ,  the n a m e  o f  the first author is given fo llow ed by the w o rd s  " e t  al." as for 
e x a m p le — N a u  et al. (1974).
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References  to journals sh ou ld  include the au th or 's  n a m e  fo l low ed  by initials, year, paper  title, journa l  title, 
v o lu m e  nu m b er  and page num bers ,  e.g.
S in g h .  N .  N .  (1980). The effects o f  facial screening on  in fa n t  self-injury. Journal o f  E x p e r im e n ta l  T herapy  and  
E x p e r im e n ta l  Psychiatry .  I I .  131-134 .
or
Beck. A. T.. W ard. C. H..  M e n d e ls o n .  M ..  M o c k .  J.. &  Erbaugh. J. (1961).  A n  in ven tory  for measuring  
depress ion .  Archives o f  G enera l  P sy c h ia try .  4. 5 6 1 - 5 6 5 .
References to b ooks shou ld  include the a uthor 's  n a m e  fo l lo w e d  by initials, year, paper  title, editors,  book  
title, vo lu m e  and page numbers ,  p lace o f  p u b lic a t ion ,  pub lisher ,  e.g.
Brownell.  K. D. (19S4). Behavioural m edic ine .  In C. M .  Franks. G. T. W ilson . P. C. K endall .  &. K. D.  
Brownell  (Eds.) .  Annual rev iew  o f  b eh av ior  th era p y  ( V o l .  10. pp. 11-20). N e w  Y ork:  G u ilford  Press.
Footnote.*, as distinct from literature references, sh o u ld  b e  indicated by the fo l lo w in g  sym bols:  *, +. i .  N il. ' .  
c o m m e n c in g  anew on each page.
Illus tra tions a n d  diagrams  sh o u ld  be kept to a m in im u m :  they should be num bered  and m arked on  the 
back with the a u th o r ’s name. C a p t io n s  a c c o m p a n y in g  i l lustrations  should  be typew ritten  on  separate  sheets.  
D ia g ra m s  and graphs must be drawn with Indian ink on  s tou t  paper or tracing linen.
P h o to g r a p h s  and p h o to m icro g ra p h s  sh o u ld  be su b m it t e d  u n m ou n ted  and on  g lo ssy  paper.
T h e  fo l lo w in g  standard sy m b o ls  sh o u ld  be used in l ine  drawings since they are easily  ava i lab le  to the 
printers:
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T ables  and figures should be constructed  so  as to be in te ll ig ib le  w ithout reference to the  text, each  table and 
c o lu m n  being provided with a heading.
Tables.  C a p t io n s  should be typewritten togeth er  on  a se pa r a te  sheet. T he  sam e  in fo r m a t io n  sh ou ld  not be 
reproduced  in bo th  tables and  figures.
B U S I N E S S  C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  
All co m m u n ic a t io n s  regarding advert is ing,  su b s c r ip t io n s ,  changes  o f  address, reprints etc. . shou ld  be 
addressed to the publishers. Elsevier Science  Ltd. T h e  B o u le \a rd .  Langford Lane.  K id l in g ton .  Oxford  
0 X 5  1GB. England.
C opyrigh t .  All  authors m ust  sign the 'Transfer o f  C o p y r ig h t ’ agreem ent before the article can  be published.  
Thfe transfer agreement enab les  Elsevier Sc ience  Ltd to pro tect  the copyrighted  m ater ia l  for the authors ,  but 
d o e s  not  relinquish the author 's  proprietary rights.  T h e  copyright transfer co v ers  the exc lus ive  rights to 
reproduce and distribute the article, in c lud ing  reprints,  p h o to g r a p h ic  reproductions ,  m icro fo r m  or any other  
reproduct ions  o f  similar nature and translat ions ,  and  inc ludes  the right to a d ap t  the art icle for use in 
conjunct ion  yy ith com puter  system s and program s,  in c lu d in g  reproduction or p u b lica t ion  in m achine-readable  
form and incorporation  in retrieyal system s. A u th o r s  are respons ib le  for ob ta in in g  from  the cop yr igh t  holder  
perm iss ion to reproduce any figures for w h ich  c o p y r ig h t  exists .
P roo;*. P age proofs will be sent to the a u th o r  (or th e  f irst-mentioned a u th o r  in a paper o f  multiple  
authorsh ip i  for checking. Corrections to the proofs m ust  be restricted to printer’s errors. A n y  substantial  
alterations o th e r  than these may be charged  to the a u th o r .  P lease note that authors are urged to check their 
proofs carefully before return, since the inclusion o f  late corrections cannot  be guaranteed. In order to facilitate  
rapid pub lica t ion ,  authors are requested to correct the ir  proofs  and return them  im m ed ia te ly  to Elsevier 
Science Ltd. B am pfylde Street. Exeter EX1 2 A H ,  E n g la n d .
Reprint*. Reprints  and cop ies  o f  the issue (at a spec ia lly  reduced rate) ma> be o b ta in e d  at a reasonable  cost, 
proyided that they are ordered yyhen the p roofs  are returned  and using the reprint order form  yvhich will 
accom pany the au th or’s proofs.
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GREATER GLASGOW COMMUNITY AND MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES NHS TRUST
PARTICIPANTS INFORMATION SHEET
STUDY OF RE-EXPERIENCING SYMPTOMS IN POST- TRAUMATIC STRESS
Thankyou for your interest in this study. I would like to give you some more information about it 
and to invite you to participate if you wish.
Please read the information carefully.If you decide that you are able to take part, please detach and 
sign the consent form below and return it to me in the stamped addressed envelope provided.
Why is this study being done ?
People who have suffered a traumatic experience like yourself, often re-experience their trauma 
through intrusive pictures, thoughts, feelings and memories of it for a long time afterwards. This 
can be very distressing. We would like to be able to understand these symptoms more fully, so we 
can treat them more effectively. To do this we need to gather information in the form of personal 
descriptions of how exactly individuals re-experience their trauma.
Where will I have to go ?
If you decide to help with this study, you will be invited to meet with me, Gillian Simpson, at a 
place which is convenient for you, such as your local Clinical Psychology Department.
How long will it take ?
We will meet only once, for between one and one and a half hours. This session will be split into 
two sections to allow for a short break in the middle. You can of course take other breaks if you 
wish, and it is you right to terminate the session at any point.
What will I be expected to do ?
I will ask you some questions about your reaction to your trauma. I will be seeking information 
specifically about imagery, nightmares, flashbacks and any other ways in which you re-experience 
your trauma. Your responses will be audiotaped to allow analysis by myself and another Clinical 
Psychologist, Dr. Kate Davidson . I will also ask you to complete three short questionnaires which 
assess your general mood.
What will happen to the information ?
All information will be kept strictly confidential. It will be looked at by myself and Dr. Davidson
only. The study should be complete by October 1998. All questionnaires and tapes will then be
destroyed.
Will my current treatment be affected ?
No. Participation in this study will not affect your patient rights or treatment in any way.
If you decide not to participate, or decide to withdraw your consent at any stage, this will not affect 
your patient rights or treatment in any way.
I hope you will be interested in taking part in this study.
GREATER GLASGOW COMMUNITY AND MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES NHS TRUST
CONSENT FORM
I, (please print nam e)......................................................................................
of, (please print address )..........................................................................................................
TeL-
have read and understood the information provided.
I understand that part of my session will be audiotaped.
I understand that participation or non participation in this study will have no effect upon my current 
treatment.
I AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY AND GIVE MY CONSENT TO THE 
RESEARCH PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN THE INFORMATION SHEET.
DATE................................................... SIGNED
Please return this form in the envelope provided. Thankyou .
G illian S im pson, Trainee Clinical Psychologist.
U niversity Department o f  Psychological M edicine, A cadem ic Centre. Gartnavel Royal H ospital, 
1055 Great W estern Road, G lasgow  G12 OXH.
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BEHAVIOUR RESEARCH A N D  THERAPY
incorporating A D V A N C E S  IN B E H A V I O U R  R E S E A R C H  A N D  T H E R A P Y
Information fo r  Contributors
B ehav iour  R e m a rc h  a n d  T h e ra p y  incorporating Advances in B eh a v io u r  Research a n d  T herapy  '.viil he 
published monthly .
Neither  the Editors nor the publisher  accept responsibility t'or the v iew s or statements expressed by 
authors.
This  journal should be cited in lists o f  references as Behaviour R esearch  a n d  Therapy .
M a n u s c r ip t s
All manuscripts  subm itted  for publication  for the regular section o f  the journal and all scientific  
corre sp on d en ce  should be sent to the Editor: D r  S.  R . a c h m a n .  D ep a rtm e n t  o f  P sy c h o lo g y  University  o f  
British C o lu m b ia .  V an cou ver .  British C olum bia .  Canada V 6 T  1Z4. M anuscr ipts  for the Behavioral  
A ssessm en t  Section shou ld  be sent to D r  S. T a y l o r .  D epartm ent  o f  Psychiatry .  2 2 5 5  W esbrook  M ali .  
V ancouver .  British C o lu m b ia .  C a n a d a  V 6 T  2A 1.
M anuscr ipts  should be typewritten  o n  one side  o f  the paper, double  s p a c e d  and in triplicate (one orig inal  
and two carbon  copies i.  T he  original m anuscript and diagrams will be discarded  one m onth  after pub lication  
unless the publisher is requested to return original material to the author.
M anuscr ipts  must be carefu lly  checked  and p roof  a ltera t ions— excep t  printer's errors— should  be 
minimal.
D isks
A u th o r s  are encouraged  to subm it  a com puter  disk (5.25" or  3.5" H D  D D  disk) conta in ing  the final 
v ersion o f  the paper a long  with the final manuscript to the editorial office. P lease observe the fo l low ing  criteria:
1. Send only hard copy w hen  first subm itt ing your paper.
2. W h en  vour paper has been refereed, revised if  necessary and accepted , send a disk conta in ing  the final 
version with the final hard c op y .  M a k e  sure that the disk and the hard copy match exactly .
3. Specify what softw are was used, including which release, e.g.  W ord P erfect  5.1.
4. Specify what c o m p u te r  was used (either IB M -com patib le  PC or A p p le  M acintosh) .
5. Include the text rile and separate  tabie and illustration riles, if  available .
t>. T he  rile should follow the general instructions on style arrangem ent and . in particular, the reference  
style o f  this journal as g iven  below .
7. T h e  tile shouid be s ingie->paced and  should use the w rap-around  en d -o f - l ine  feature, i.e. no returns at 
the end o f  each line. All textual e lem ents  should begin Hush left: no paragraph indents . Place two  
returns after every e lem ent such as  title, headings, paragraphs, rigure and table ca ll-outs.
8. K eep  a back-up disk for reference and safety.
The articles submitted m ust co n ta in  original material  which has not been published and which is not  
being considered  for pub lication  e lsew here .  Papers accepted by B eh a v io u r  R esearch  a n d  T h era p y  may not be 
published elsewhere m any lan gu age  w ith o u t  the consent  o f  the Editor.
T he  title o f  the paper, the a uthor 's  n am e  and surname and the nam e and address o f  the institute, hospita l  
etc. where the work w as carried ou t .  sh o u id  be indicated at the top o f  the paper. W here possible , the Fax  
num ber  o f  the corresponding author sh o u ld  be supplied with the m anuscr ip t ,  for use by the publisher.
S u m m a r ie s .  A  sum m ary, not ex cee d in g  2'JO words, should be subm itted  on  a separate sheet in duplicate. The  
su m m a ry  will appear at the b eg in n ing  o f  the article.
K e yw ords .  Authors sh ou ld  include up to six keywords with their article. T h e  contro lled  list o f  k eyw ord s  is 
based on the A P A  list o f  index descriptors ,  however,  authors may include o n e  or tw o additional 'tree 
keyw ords if  they wish to d o  so.
R eferen ce s  should be prepared carefu lly  using the Publication  M a n u a l  o f  the A m e r ic a n  P sycho log ica l  
A sso c ia t io n  for style. They sh o u id  be p laced  on a separate  sheet at the end o f  the paper, doub le -spaced ,  and  in 
alphabetica l  order.
References should  be q u o ted  in the text by giving the author's n am e ,  fo l lo w ed  by the year.  e.g. (Hersen and  
Barlow. 1976) or Hersen and Barlow (1976 i .
For m o r e  than two  authors ,  the n am e o f  the rirst author is g iven  fo l lo w ed  by the w ords "et al." as tor  
e x a m p le — N au et al. (1974).
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I n o  >r m a t  ion tor C ontr ibu tors  — c o n t in u e d  j
R e f e r e n c e ^  to j ou r na l s  s hou l d  inc lude  the  a u t h o r ' s  n a m e  fo l lowed  by Initials,  year ,  p a p e r  title,  j o u rn a l  title, 
o ' l u n i e  n u m b e r  a n d  pa g e  n u mb e r s ,  e.g.
Si ivah.  N.  N.  i 19SU). T h e  effects o f  facial  s c reen ing  o n  i n f an t  se l f- injury.  J o u rn a l  ot E x p e r im e n ta l  Therapy a nd  
L x p e r h n e n t a t  IF vch ia tr v .  11. 151 134.
■ m
Beck .  A.  T. .  W a r d .  C.  H. .  M e n d e l s o n .  M. .  M o c k .  J.. W E r b a u g h .  J. (1961).  A n  i nventory  fo r  m ea s u r in g  
d e p r e s s i o n .  A rch ives  at G eneral  P s \ c h ia t r y .  4. o61 - ?65 .
R e f e r e n c e s  to  b o o k s  s hou l d  i nc l ude  the a u t h o r ' s  n a m e  fo l lowed  by  init ials,  year ,  p a p e r  title,  edi tors ,  b o o k  
;n!e.  v o l u m e  a n d  page  n um be r s ,  p lace  o f  p u b l i ca t ion ,  p u bl i s he r ,  e.g.
B r ow ne l l .  K. D.  (19*4).  B e ha v io ur a l  medic ine .  In C.  M .  F ra n k s .  G.  T.  Wi l s on .  P. C.  Ke n da l l .  A K.  D. 
B r o w n e l l  i E d s . ). A n n u a l  review of behavior therapy  (Vol .  10. pp.  I 1-20).  New Y o r k :  G u i l f o r d  Press.
F o o tn o te s ,  as  d i s t i nc t  f r o m l i t e ra tu r e  r eferences ,  s hou l d  b e  i nd i ca t ed  by the  f ol lowing  symbol s :  *. w i .  X . *.  
c o m m e n c i n g  a ne w o n  each  page.
!!!ustra::-‘'\s a n d  J i i teram s  s h o u l d  be kep t  to a m i n i m u m :  they s h o u i d  be n u m b e r e d  a n d  m a r k e d  on  the 
b a c k  w i t h  m e  a u t h o r ' s  name .  C a p t i o n s  a c c o m p a n y i n g  i l l us t r a t ions  s h o u l d  be t yp e wr i t t e n  o n  s e pa r a t e  sheets.  
D i a g r a m s  . .nd g r a p h s  m u s t  be d r a w n  wi th  Ind i an  ink on  s t ou t  p a p e r  o r  t r ac i ng  linen.
P h o t o g r a p h s  a n d  p h o t o m i c r o g r a p h s  s h o u l d  be s u b m i t t e d  u n m o u n t e d  a n d  o n  glossy paper .
T h e  f o l l o w i ng  s t a n d a r d  s ym bo l s  sh o u l d  be used  in l ine d r a w i n g s  s ince t hey  are  easily ava i l ab l e  to the
p r in t e r s :
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T a b l e s  a n d  f i g u r e s  s ho u l d  be c o n s t r u c t e d  so as  to be intel l igible  w i t h o u t  r e fe rence  to the text ,  each  t able  a n d  
c o i u m n  b e i ng  p r ov i d e d  wi th  a h e a d i ng .
Tables.  C a p t i o n s  s hou l d  be t yp ewr i t t e n  t og e t he r  on  a s e p a r a t e  sheet .  T h e  s a m e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s h o u ld  not  be 
r e p r o d u c e d  :n b o  tit t ables  a n d  figures.
Bl  SI N E S S  C O M M U N I C A T I O N S
-Ml c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  r e ga r d i ng  adve r t i s i ng ,  su bs c r ip t i o n s ,  c h a n g e s  o f  ad d r es s ,  r ep r i n t s  etc. .  s ho u ld  be 
a d d r e s s e d  to t he  publ i sher s .  Elsevier  Science Ltd.  T h e  Bo ul ev a rd .  L a n g f o r d  La ne .  K i d i ing t on .  O x f o r d  
0 X 5  1 GB.  E n g la n d .
( ' i/ m t /go.'. All  a u t h o r s  mus t  sign the  ' T ra n s f e r  o f  C o p y r i g h t '  a g r e e m e n t  be f or e  the ar t i c le  c a n  be pub l i shed .  
T h i s  t r a n s f e r  a g r e e m e n t  e nab l es  Elsevier  Science L td  to p r o t e c t  the  c o p y r i g h t e d  ma t e r i a l  for  the  a u th o r s ,  but  
d o e s  n o t  r e l i nqu i s h  the a u t h o r ' s  p r op r i e t a r y  r ights .  T h e  c o py r i gh t  t r a n s f e r  cove r s  the exclus ive r ights  to 
r e p r o d u c e  a n d  d i s t r i b u t e  the ar t icle,  i nc l ud i ng  repr int s ,  p h o t o g r a p h i c  r e p r o d u c t i o n s ,  m i c r o f o r m  or  any o t h e r  
r e p r o d u c t i o n s  o f  s imi l a r  n a t u r e  a n d  t r ans l a t ions ,  a n d  i nc l udes  the  r ight  to a d a p t  the ar t i c le  for use :n 
c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  c o m p u t e r  >ystems a n d  p r o g r a m s ,  i nc l ud i ng  r e p r o d u c t i o n  o r  p ub l i c a t i on  in m a c h i n e - r e a d a b l e  
f o r m  a n d  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  in ret r i eval  sys t ems .  A u t h o r s  are  r e sp on s ib le  for  o b t a i n i n g  f r o m the c o p y r i gh t  h o ld e r  
p e r m i s s i o n  to r e p r o d u c e  any f igures for  wh i ch  c o p yr i gh t  exists.
Troii fs .  Page  proof ' s will be sent  to the a u t h o r  (or  t h e  f i r s t -me n t i on ed  a u t h o r  in a p a p e r  o f  mul t i p ie  
e u l h o r s h i p i  for  check i ng .  Corrections to the proofs must he restricted to printer’s errors. Any subs tan t i a l  
a l t e r a t i o n s  o t h e r  t ha n  these may be c h a r ge d  to the  a u t h o r .  Pl ease  n o t e  t ha t  authors are urged to check their 
proofs carefully  before return, since the inclusion o f  late corrections cannot be guaranteed. In o r d e r  to faci l i ta te 
r ap id  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  a u t h o r s  ar e  r e q ue s t ed  to co r re c t  t he i r  p r oo f s  a n d  r e t u rn  t h e m  i mm ed i a t e l y  to Elsevier  
Sc i ence  L td .  B a m p f y l d e  St reet .  Exe t e r  EX1 2 A H .  En g la n d .
R e p r i n t s  R e p r i n t s  a n d  cop ies  o f  the  issue (at  a special ly r e du ce d  ra te)  may be o b t a i n e d  at  a r ea s on a b l e  cost ,  
p r o v i d e d  t ha t  they a r e  o r d e r e d  w h e n  the p r o o f s  a r e  r e t u r n e d  a n d  us ing  the r epr i nt  o r d e r  f o r m  whi ch  wiil 
a c c o m p a n y  ihc  a u t h o r ' s  proofs .
APPENDIX 4:2
DSM IV Diagnostic criteria for PTSD
Appendix 4:2
DSMIV diagnostic criterion B (re-experiencing) for PTSD ( APA 1994, p428 )
B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the following
ways
1) recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event, including images thoughts or 
perceptions.
2) recurrent, distressing dreams of the event.
3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of 
reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback 
episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated).
4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal and external cues that 
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or 
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
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Verbatim examples of sensory re-experiencing
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Appendix 4:3
Verbatim examples of reported re-experiencing in each sensory domain
1) VISUAL
“...I see his son in this dream. H e’s got something in his hand, some kind o f  weapon 
and he is jumping about like a boxer, from side to side.. ” (P2)
“...that wakes me....the Iraqis visiting me in my bed.....em all they burnt guys
are all standing around my bed looking at me, I  usually see that..... ” (P4)
2) AUDITORY
"... I  wake up with a bang, like a bullet....and you hear the crack..... and you wake 
up... ” (P5)
3) OLFACTORY
“...I  can smell the petrol, I  can see everything, I'm  reliving every bit.... ” (P3)
"... the smell. em is like bacon burning.... ” (P4)
4) PAIN
“... It's scary, I  wake up, I'm very painful, sweating and shouting out.... ” (PI)
"... this uncontrollrd picture that you can't stop, you had the smell o f  smoke and your 
arms were lowping because you hadjust hit the steering wheel and you feel all that 
pain.. ” (P6)
5) TASTE
“... sometimes I  get a taste in my mouth, I  don't know what it i s , like a dryness...and 
when that happens I  usually get a flashback... " (P5)
“... /  wake up in the night and I  see the motor, and I  see myself trapped in it, I  smell 
the smoke, and I  taste it in my throat. ” ( P6)
6) TACTILE
"... I  fe lt I  was actually there, I  actually fe lt their hands in my hands to take them out 
(of the crashed van)..” (P3)
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Appendix 4:4
Examples of verbatim descriptions of formats of re-experiencing 
1) STILL
"... my crash is a picture, there is a vehicle on top o f my vehicle and nothing is 
moving. I'm  sitting looking out o f the windscreen o f  the motor....seeing it all..... ” (P6)
2) LIKE A VIDEO
"... as i f  I  am standing back watching them coming, you see them coming into the 
room, as i f  you are watching it, as i f  it is a video... ” (P5)
3) SLOW MOTION
"... it all comes back in wee flashes..wee slow motions, one after another and it builds 
into a big picture ” (P3)
4) BACKWARDS VIDEO
“ when 1 started seeing this andfeeling it in my head, I  seen that first (image of a 
stabbed man) and then it goes to the bit before that, then it works itself to the very 
start and I  always go back to the night before.... ” (P2)
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Appendix 5:1
CLINICAL CASE RESEARCH STUDIES - ABSTRACTS 
Case 1
Treatment of recurrent nightmares using imagery rehearsal: a case 
study
Abstract
Imagery rehearsal is a cognitive-behavioural technique which has been shown to be 
effective in reducing the frequency of nightmares. A case is presented where imagery 
rehearsal techniques were successfully utilised to treat recurrent, posttraumatic 
nightmares resulting from a scaffolding accident five years previously. The role of 
imagery in models of posttraumatic stress disorder is considered.
Case 2
Cognitive deficits associated with early onset Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus. 
Abstract
A case is presented of early onset ( prior to 4 years o ld ) Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus. 
This case highlights the importance of cognitive assessment in diabetes management. 
The role of cognitive deficit as a maintaining factor in dangerous eating behaviour is 
explored. The need for early identification of cognitive vulnerability is important so 
that the educational needs of these children can be adequately met.
Case 3
Adaptation to chronic pain : a case study.
Abstract
The medical model of disease seeks to identity pathology, obtain a diagnosis and thus 
treat the symptoms of the ‘disease’. However, chronic pain does not fit easily into this 
model because often it occurs in the absence of identifiable pathology. Psychological 
approaches are effective in helping people cope with their pain and can help people 
achieve improved function. A case is presented of the treatment of a 48 year old 
woman with a one year history of chronic, disabling pain of unknown aetiology. Pain 
management strategies focused on improving mood and function by increasing 
perceived control over pain symptoms. Maintenance of treatment gains is considered 
within a a stages of change framework.
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